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Editors
Dilipkumar Mohanta
Prabal Kumar Sen

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WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER ACCOUNT OF LANGUAGE

Kalyan Sen Gupta

In the Preface to the *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein writes: 'Recently I had occasion to re-read my first book... . It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish these old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking. For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again... . I have been forced to recognise grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book'. This shows how he is moving to a new horizon away from his previous thought which. he finds now, is essentially flawed. The grave mistake he detects is the view that words are *names* of objects. As he puts it in the *Tractatus* : 'the name means the object. The object is its meaning'.[1] But in the *Philosophical Investigations,* he starts by referring not to the *Tractatus* but to St. Augustine's account of language learning. This ploy is clearly to highlight that the grave mistake in question is as old as the hills. Thus the *Investigations* opens with a few lines from Augustine's text, *Confessions*: 'When my olders named some object... I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered, and then with Wittgenstein's remark: 'These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of language, we find the roots of the following idea : Every word has a meaning. The meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.''[2] Let us try to understand the real import of the theory or picture of language just sketched by Wittgenstein, and than show how he responds to it.

Evidently, in this picture of language, the point of contact between words and things is provided by names. Sentences are combinations of words or names, and it is this name that relates language to reality, and thereby contributes to the meaning of a sentence. But how is it that a sentence as a concatenation of names is not a mere list of names, but has sense or meaning? A sentence, as Wittgenstein holds. is a picture of a fact, i.e. the fact that words in a sentence are arranged in a particular way pictures the fact that things are arranged in a particular way: AB → ab. Different combinations of words constitute different pictures of facts. And it is this picturing relation that determines the sense of a sentence. This picturing relation should be taken as conventional. Thus to say that 'X is on the top of Y' is not to put or place X on the top of Y. 'On the top of' is rather a conventional way of expresing the relation between X and Y, when we say, 'X is on the top of Y'.[3]

Wittgenstein now sees the limitation of the picture version of meaning, and in the *Philosophical Investigations*, rejects it completely. First, on this version, the meaning of a word is the object named by it. The weakness of this stance is exposed imediately in view of the fact that meaning is somthing different from object. Napoleon dies, but the meaning of the word 'Napoleon' does not die. Of course, it may be said that when Witgenstein talks about object, he does not mean by it what we call ordinary object. Unfortunately, he has not given any example of object. So when he says, the meaning of a word is literally the object it stands for, what kind of object is it? Again, he has not given any example of elementary sentence, which is supposed to have point to point correspondence with a fact. So, when he says, all meaningful sentence of ordinary language are ultimately analysable into elementary sentences, this does not convey anything.

Most crucially, if the object names by a word constitutes its meaning, then this denotative link is established by ostensive definition, which consists in pointing at an object and uttering its name. Ostensive definition is thus the foundation for explaining the meaning of an expression. And this brings out the kernel of the Augustinian conception of learning language. An excellent example of Augustine's point is found in Wittgenstein's description of the slab-game: 'Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an aristan B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words ''block'', ''pillar'', ''slab'', ''beam''. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such and such a call.[4] This obviously represents the denotative model of meaning; but to take it as the paradigm of an account of meaning is a grave mistake. For an expresion can have meaning even if it does not refer to an object.

In fact, early Wittgenstein's and Augustine's idea is premissed upon the assumption that there lies hidden a fundamental unity or essence beneath different languages, and it is to be unearthed. This essence of language is to communicate what is true or false; and it is this cognitive feature of language that counts most. Wittgenstein's response to it is now negative; it is to deny any need for exploring any mysterious essence of language not open to view: "...what is hidden.... is of no interest to us".[5] What is of interest to us is the way language works, what are the things that we do with language— "something that already lies open to view". Then we find that language is not one uniform thing, but a host of multifarious activities. We use language to describe, report, inform, affirm, speculate, tell stories, make jokes, solve problem, thank, curse, greet or pray.[6] All these activities Wittgenstein calls language games. Thus his focus is shifted from the cognitive part of language (which stands apart from any action or intention of speaker-hearer) to the large context of human action and behaviour. Meaning now depends on our different uses of language in different contexts, on our play of different language games.

Let us specify some of the language games that we play[7]. When some one say, 'Ram is sick'—this statement places its speaker, its hearer and its referent (what the statement deals with) in a specific way. The speaker is the one who knows what the situation is with Ram; the hearer is the one who is put in the position of having to refuse or give his assent to it; the referent itself has to be handled in a way that demands to be correctly identified. In short, this is how people play the game of stating of fact which can be called true or false. Usually scientists play this game of denotation.

Now consider a declaration, 'The University will remain closed tomorrow'. It is clear that this is a case where the previous specifications no longer apply. The university will remain closed because it has been so declared by the Vice-Chancellor. The addresse is now placed in a new context: what is declared is not subject to any verification by him. The Vice-Chancellor is invested with authority to make this kind of utterance, which can directly affect both the referent (the University) and the addresse (the University member).

Another kind of utterance is 'Give money to the poor'. It is a prescriptive one, and can be modulated either as an order, or a request, or a recommendation for what one ought to do. The question of truth or falsity is irrelevant here, just as it is in the case of a declaration by a proper authority. The speaker here is cleary placed in the position of an authority, who expects the addresse to perform the action referred to.

What is most crucial, each of the different categories of utterance can be defind "in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put in exactly the some way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules determining the properties of each of the pieces: in other words, the proper way to move them."[8] This shows that there cannor be any game without rules. Each utterance is a move in a game following its rules which identify it as belonging to a particular game, and not to another.

The relevant question is : Why this appeal to game? What is it that Wittgenstein intends to get at about language by introducing the concept of game? To understand this requires a look into the concept of game.

1. The activities we call games have no common properties which enable us to call them 'game' or apply the same word to them all. The dogma that they have something in common is false.
2. Hence it is not possible to define 'game'.
3. But our ability to define a word is not a necessary condition for understanding it. Even if we cannot give a definition of 'game', it does not follow that we cannot understand or explain 'game'.
4. The way we can explain 'game' is by giving paradigmatic examples of it with the addition of similarity-clause, 'These and any similar things are called games'. Since such a concept cannot by defined, it has no fixed boundary. We can capture or explain it only by giving a multiplicity of examples, which should always be followed by similarity-clause.

We are now beginning to see the reason why Wittgenstein invokes the concept of game. He does so to suggest the following characteristics of language. Language has no single essence "All we can do", in the words of Lyotard, "is gaze in wonderment at the diversity of discursive species, just as we do at the diveresity of plant or animal species".[9] Thus, to understand the workings of language is to recognise its variety and multiplicity with nothing in common between them. "Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, but they are related to one another in many different ways."[10] This incidentally shows why it is wrong to bog down to a single rule for of meaning as object named by an expression. In fact, stating fact is only one of the jobs that we perform with language, and meaning of an expression consists in the use in which it can be put in one or another of the many language games constituting language. We do not understand the utterance, 'Ram is sick' in the same way we understand the utterance, 'Don't tell a lie'. In the former case, the meaning of the utterance is linked to what is true on false; while in the latter case, it is not so.

The relevant question is : All the language games are, after all, games of the same language. But how can it be so if they have nothing in common between them? The concept of family resemblance is an answer to this question. As Wittgenstein puts it:

> Consider...the proceedings we call 'games'. I mean board-games, card-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to than all? Don't say, 'There must be something common, or they would not all be called 'games'; but *look* and *see* whether there is something common to all, for if you look at them, you will not see something that is in common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that....And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing.....I can think of no better explanation to characterize these similarities 'family resemblances'; for the various resemblances between members of a family : build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and in the same way.[11]

Once again, analogy with game comes into picture. The various activities that we call 'games' are games because of a network of similarities. a large number of relationships between these activities. This is what is highlighted by the metaphor of family resemblance. It is employed to drive home the various overlapping similaries or resemblances that exist between different language-activities, just as they exist. or are present among the different members of a family.

These resemblances may be of different kinds : build, facial features attitude, manner of speaking, etc., in terms of which we group people as members of the same family. The obvious implication is that membership of a family does not consist in having a set of common properties. In fact, no specific property is necessary or sufficient for being a member of a family. Thus the metaphor of family resemblance is quite illuminating to indicate that the bond between different language games is not anything like common properties, but overlapping similarities which ensure the use of the same word, 'language'. to them.

It is better now to understand more specifically what Wittgenstein has in mind when he uses the concept of family resemblance.[12] Of course, he is not slow even to assert that games have no common properties, since we do not see them. But the point is that even if we cannot see any common property, it does not follow that there is none. Indeed, should we not say that different language-games have something in common in virtue of which they are members of 'language'? This sort of quibble will not, however, be very fair to Wittgenstein. His point is that we normally explain 'game' not by giving a definition of it, but by giving paradigmatic examples. Even if we can discover common properties, we need not bother about them, since they do not reveal the present practice of explaining 'game'.

Further, one may think—the contention that games have no sharp boundaries implies that there are 'borderline cases of disputes about their applicability'. So why should Wittgenstein stick to the word 'game', which is vague, and whose use is disputable? This is also not to read Wittgenstein's intention in the right way. When he talks about 'lack of sharp boundaries,' his intention is only to draw our attention to the fact that games do not admit of any strict definition in terms of a set of common properties.

None the less, there are problems about the concept of family resemblance, and we have to see whether they arise from Wittgenstein's point of view.

One of the questions is whether any family concept is coherent. This question seems legitimate. For, if the concept is explained with reference to overlapping similarities, then anything can fall under it; since everthing resembles every thing also in some respects. The concept under the circumstances in thus vacuous.

It is posible to counter this argument in a number of 'misguided ways'. This is put by Baker and Hacker in the following way: "Each starts from the assumption that giving a set of paradigms cannot be a correct explanation of a family resemblance concept, but only a fragment of a correct explantion. There are different strategies for specifying the required supplementation. First, one could demand a precise catalogue of the concepts of resemblance relevant for determining whether something falls under the concept. [Again] one could demand the indication of negative paradigms i.e. an explanation by examples of what does not fall under the concept."[13]

All such approaches are misguided, for they overlook what we in fact do, and the practice we follow. We do not explain 'game' by any strict definition. We have a 'tolerably definite' practice of employing the word, and we do not apply it to everything whatever; explanation of 'game' with reference to various examples is taken by us to be a correct explanation of it. It is not the proper business of philosophy to ponder how this is posible. For "a rule that can be applied in practice is in order".[14]

Again, when Wittgenstein talks about family resemblance, it implies that similarities among games, e.g. board-games, card-games, Olympic games and the like justify calling games 'games', and that lack of relevant similarities would justify refusing to call any activity 'game'. But the problem is, how to justify that the family resemblance concept applies to games, but not to activities like warfare, theatrical performance or rituals which are not paradigmatic games? Can it be on the basis of similarities? But then, are there not resemblances at least in certain respects between warfare, etc. and paradigmatic games? Even Wittgenstein seems to suggest that justification with reference to similarities is defeasible. One response to this defeasibility thesis may be that though there is 'a considerable range of similarities between certain kinds of warfare and many paradigmatic games (competition, winning and losing, sets of rules)', these are none the less 'overbalanced' by many striking defferences as well. Hence, for a correct explanation of family reseonblance concept, it is neceassry to take into account both resemblance with and difference from paradigmatic games, and then to settle whether something falls under the concept. But all such theoretical consideration is not very crucial from Wittgenstein's point of view.

From his point of view, the crucial point is whether the concept of family resemblance is used to serve his purpose. And indeed, it serves his purpose to vindicate that relationships between the phenomena called 'language' enable us to call then 'language'.

Wittgenstein also says that games form one family. This is because of the overlapping similarities which find them together, give them a unity and allow us to speak of the concept of a game. But this alleged unity may seem 'precarious', for what we call 'game' varies from case to case. We call 'football' a games, and also 'chess' a game, Similary, varying explanations of 'game' is posible by giving different examples, or by concentrating on different paradigms: card game, board game or Olympic game. If so, what would 'license' us to speak of the unity of the game which demands some uniform way of determining what would count as 'game'? This problem, however, seems to be without any sting if the focus is on our practice. Indeed, we give varying explanations of game by different examples, and accept them as correct. And we 'wish' without any feeling of uneasiness to call different kinds of games (language phenomena) 'game' ('language'). The idea that this unity is not possible is entertained only by those who think that the unity of a concept is captured only by strict definition. But this is the very idea that Wittgenstein would not approve of.

What we gather from the foregoing is this. Wittgenstein talks about multifarious uses of different language games. To him, expressions are as varied as the language games in which they occur, and they have different meanings according to the respective games in which they figure. Incidentally. Wittgenstein speaks not only of '*use*' but also employs various expresions like "the *functions* of words and sentences",[15] their *offices*, "their' *aimes* and *purpose*"[16]. The central idea behind all such expressions is to insist on employment of words and sentences in different language games by following their respective rules. Hence, the fundamental concept is 'following a rule'. In the *Tractatus*, the model is *calculus* in the sense of a structured system of strictly defined rules (rules of logic) operating in an exact, orderly and uniform manner; and determing our application of them from outside. This implies two things. First, rules dictate us whether or not we are doing something correctly, independent of our practice of obeying or following these rules. We are simply dictated or coerced by the rules for what we do. Obeying a rule is simply a matter of compulsion. Secondly, rules are quite objective and external to us. Take the arithmetical example. The rules of arithmetic settle in advance what is correct and what is wrong when we *e.g.* add 2+2. There is a uniformly correct answer that 2+2 is equal to is 4. The standard of correctness in already imposed upon us by the rules, prior to our application of them. Or, they remain independent of us before our observance of them, and are not dependent on our activity of applying them.

These two features of rules, as Wittgenstein remarks in the *Philosophical Investigations*, indicate that rules are like railway lines along which we move in a fixed direction,[17] or like a machine which works in a determiniate and determining way.[18] Of course, he does not deny that rules guide us or constitute the standard of correctness. It is only that he is against any such model like railway lines or machines on the ground that this reduces the concept of guidance to that of coercion, and makes the concept of the standard of correctness as something external to us and objective. He emphasises that a rule is constituted by our collective use of it, and that rule following "is a general practice established by agreement, custom and training". This means that rules which guide us, and give us the standard of correctness are not independent of us, and do not by any means form any coercive standard, external to our rule-following practices themselves. To explain his point, he gives the example of signpost. A signpost indicates what direction to take. But there is nothing coercive in it; on the contrary, it depends upon the fact that there is a custom, or a practice, which establishes the uses that we make generally of signposts. This is exactly the way we should take the rule of a language—just like the custom of reading a signpost.

So, what is crucial is custom. Wittgenstein observes: "a person goes by a signpost only in so far as there exists a regular use of signpost, a custom."[19] Again: "the application of the concept 'following a rule' 'presupposes a custom'".[20] In this context, he also uses expressions like 'institution'and 'practice'. All such expressions have the same connotation, implying that use of language involves the regular practice of obeying a rule. The idea of custom refers to this regular or established practice. As Wittgenstein puts it: "The application of the concept following a rule' presupposes a custom. Hence, it would be nonsense to say that just once in the history of the world some one followed a rule (or a signpost), played a game, uttered a sentence, or understood one; and so on''.[21]

The introduction of the notion of custom denotes two important things. (1) Rule-following is not an inner activity, but is a public matter. It is not a mysterious activity, but shows itself in our agreed practice. (2) The other is that rule-following is esentially a social practice. It is the agreement among the community that establishes the rule we follow. In the words of Wittgenstein: ''The word 'agreement' and the word 'rule' are related to one another; they are cousins. It I teach the use of the one word he learns the other with it''.[22] Since rule following is a community-centred activity, there cannot be any private language. There must be something to check whether or not someone is following a rule. It is only some public criteria which come from community-agreed practice that can do the trick.

Further, as rules depend on the agreed and accepted practices of a community, there is no extrinsic or objective factor other than the constraint decided upon by common agreement. One is not following a rule correctly if it goes against social or community practice. There is no world, as in the *Tractatus*, imposing restraint from outside on how we use language. In the *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein makes it a point to vindicate the futility of any external justification or grounding for our practices. This justification lies in what we in fact do, in our practices themselves. As Wittgenstein observes: ''Giving grounds....comes to an end...the end is our *acting* which lies at the bottom of the language game'.[23] There is, e.g. no ground why the king moves only one square at a time in the game of chess. This is in fact how we play chess, how we follow its rule. And this means, playing a language game or following its rule is a habitul activity that we do unquestionably, and we are trained to do so as members of a linguistic community. ''Following a rule'', as Wittgenstein says, ''is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so''.[24] Or: ''The child learns this language from the grown-ups by being trained to its use. I am using the word 'trained' in a way strictly analoguous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things''.[25]

Incidentally, it will be very interesting to read Wittgenstein's pragmatics in the light of Davidson's pragmatics. Davidson thinks that of all kinds of saying, saying something true is the primary one and that a theory of meaning should be based upon it. This, however, does not mean that he does not appeal to pragmatics. For, according to him, the adequacy condition of the theory of meaning in terms of truth comes from the actual beleaviour of the native speakers which shows that they hold a sentence to be true. But it we turn to Wittgenstein, people are involved in different modes of discourse in different language games with different rules. And speakers do not always hold a sentence to be true. For example, when they give order, thank, curse, greet, pray or tell a story, truth or falsity does not matter to them at all. They are concerned with truth only when they play a certain language game, e.g. the game of science. Hence, to confine attention only to peoples' behaviour holding a sentence to be true will indeed be a narrow view of pragmatics. It will focus only on one dimension of peoples' actual behaviour, while ignoring the other dimensions of language-use and meaning.

Again, Davidson's theory of meaning requires that one language game concerned with truth/falsity be retained excluding all others. The idea is perhaps that even if there are other kinds of saying, they must culminate in a T-sentence. This too does not sound well. Native speakers, as Wittgenstein reminds us, use different kinds of utterance with different motives. Now, all the language games are qually significant, equally weighty in their relevant context. And there is, strictly speaking, no way to single out one specific language game (where we are interested in truth) as basic.

Notes and Reference :

1. *Tractatus*, 3.203.
2. *Philosophical Investigations* (PI).
3. Cf. J.R. Searle (ed.), *The Philosophy of Language*, London: Oxford University Press, *Introduction*, pp. 4-6.
4. *Philosophical Investigations*, 2.
5. Ibid., 126.
6. Ibid., 23.
7. Cf. J.F Lyotard, *The Post-Modern Condition*, Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, pp. 9-10.

8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Ibid., p. 26.
10. *Philosophical Investigations*, 65.
11. Ibid., 66-7.
12. Cf. G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding,* Oxford : Basil Blackwell, Chapter-X, pp. 186-208. I owe much to this book for my formulation of Wittgenstein's account.
13. Ibid., p. 199.
14. Cited from Baker and Hacker, op. cit. p. 199.
15. PI, 11, 17, 274, 556. 559.
16. PI. 402, 5. 6, 8, 348.
17. PI. 218.
18. PI, 193-4.
19. PI, 198.
20. *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (RFM), p. 322.
21. RFM, pp. 322-3.
22. PI, 77.
23. *On Certainty* (OC) 204.
24. PI, 77.
24. *Blue and Brown Books*, p. 77. Cf. A.C. Grayling, *Wittgenstein, (Past Masters),* pp. 77-83.

A NOTE ON THE NEGLECTED COUNTERPART OF LANGUAGE

Lopamudra Choudhury

Introduction

We interact with the external world through our sense-organs. The world we see around is represented within us, and that is how we come to know our environment. The nature of representation and the representaion itself vary from species to species, and from person to person. However, within the same species, there is commonality in representation that makes communication possible.

Representation is contained in our thought. It is propularly believed that language is the vehicle of thought. Everybody knows that thought occurs in the brain, and there is no natural language in the brain—there are just the activities of the neurons. Nevertheless, language provides a compelling analogy for thought. Another way of characterizing thought is by considering all kinds of ideas and relations among them. The internal linguistic and imagistic reasonings are not the same as their external manifestations. External manifestations of imagistic thought include maps, charts, diagrams and even gestures (Tverski 2005). External manifestation of linguistic thought includes written and spoken words. External representation varies widely. Spoken language is accompanied by gesture and intonation, while written language is accompanied by punctuation and paragraphing. On the other hand, maps and graphs are accompanied by symbols and legends. Man has created external image since the beginning of human civilization. Cave painting, petroglyphs, weaving, wood and stone curving, and stelae erect are examples of the various roles that images serve. These are religious, sacred, historical, political, expressive, informative, artistic, playful, creative or inferential. Images simplify or schematize the information, which even language does. However, the external images of objects have physical similarities to what they represent.

A mental image, according to current usage in Cognitive Science, is 'an internal representation that gives rise to the experience of perception in the absence of the appropriate sensory input'. In this sense, imagery is a perceptual representation stored in short-term memory. Imagery is popularly believed to be involved in visual-spatial reasoning. Though there can be auditory imagery, kinesthetic imagery, olfactory imagery, haptic imagery or even linguistic imagery, we will not consider here imagery other than the visual kind.

Due to the advent of neuroimaging technology, the past two decades has led to much progress in out understanding of neurological interpretation of mental image. According to one finding, about two-thirds of the brain areas that are stimulated by perception or imagery are activated in common by the two functions. It was found that primary visual cortex, the first part of the cortex to receive input from the eyes, could be activated during perception of mental imagery even when the eyes are closed. This finding is important, because it suggests that imagery can modulate perceptual processing in the brain from the beginning. This determines not just what we see, but also what we remember in seeing. We can 'see' objects in visual images because they are generated as patterns of activation within the areas of the brain used by visual perception (Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, Ladel Lynn (ed)).

Historical survey of imagery

The Greek thinkers were aware of the concept of imagery, and tried to give it a proper place in their theory building. Plato metaphorically spoke of an inner artist painting pictures in the soul (*Philebus* 39c). He suggested that memory might be similar to a block of wax into which our perceptions and thoughts mark impressions (*Theatatus* 191c, d). Aristotle supports the wax-impression model of memory, and describes this impression as a kind of picture (*De Memoria* 450 a,b). He introduces the notion of imagination related to perception, which is responsible for producing and recalling imagery (*De Anima* III, iii). Aristotle was the first systematic thinker who gave imagery a central role in cognition. He further asserted, "The soul never thinks without a mental image" (*De Anima* 431a 15-20). He believed that the representational power of language is derived from imagery, spoken words being the symbols of the inner images (*De Interpretatione* 16a; *De Anime* 420b).

Berkeley (1710) pointed out that images cannot represent categories easily, and are inherently ambiguous. Yet, our thoughts often rely on categories that are ever ambiguous. Hume (1740) held the view that percepts (impressions in his language) and images (he calls them ideas) do not differ in kind. They differ only with respect to vivacity. Frege (1879) argued that thought relies on internal representations popularly known as propositional representations that are more abstract than language. Sachs (1969) provided empirical evidence for such representations in her demonstration that people remember not the specific words in a sentence but rather the idea expressed by it. Gilbert Ryle in his *Concept of Mind* challenged the notion of a mental image as "a picture in the mind". He suggested that expressions like "picture in the mind's eye" or "imagining" would better be understood in terms of *pretending* (to oneself) to see something.

It was observed that in processing images, the visual system is involved in projecting images of certain patterns into visual display that create some well know illusions like Muller-Lyer illusion, Poggendorf illusion, Herring illusion etc. Most of the philosophers admit that imagery has intentionality, meaning thereby the characteristically mental property of being of, about, or directed at some object (real or imaginary). The philosophical concept of intentionality is only distantly related to the notion of acting intentionally (i.e. on purpose), but it is closely related to the notion of meaningful representation.

Many psychologists and philosophers of the nineteenth century popularly believed that thought should be understood it terms of language. Sigmund Freud, for example, believed that visual images reported by his patients are part and parcel or their neuroses that is something to be exorcized and replaced by verbally mediated *rational* insights as part of psychoanalysis. (Esrock, 1994, Ch. 3). However, images from dreams are the basis for the theory of Freud about human behaviour. He believed that man forms mental images according to his latent unconscious desires. The gestalt psychologists' research focused entirely on perceptual experience, and thus they had little to say about the nature or function of imagery. Thus the gestaltists ignored the concept of imagery and the behaviourists totally rejected it. In the language of Dennet (1978), the behaviourist psychology was totally *iconophobic*. This resulted into total neglect of imagery studies.

Holt (1964) indicates a number of developments that led some psychologists, in the 1950s, to refocus attention to imagery. These include research on hallucinogenic drugs, developments in electroencephalography, the discovery of REM sleep and its correlation with dreaming, and Penfield's (1958) finding that direct electrical stimulation of certain brain areas can give rise to vivid memory (or pseudo-memory) imagery. These and related findings along with the intervention of the computer scientists in recent years revived imagery as well as diagram studies. Beginning with Euler (1772), diagrams have evolved in the hands of Venn (1880) and Peirce (1896). In recent years Shin (1994), Hammer (1995), House (2001), Stapleton (2004, 2005), Choudhury and Chakraborty (2004, 2005) and others have regenerated interest in diagrams by formalising the logic of diagrams.

Most cognitive scientists hold that propositional representations require an abstract and unambiguous syntax, but there is debate about the precise structure of this syntax. Some cognitive scientists maintain that all thought relies solely on propositional representations, thereby excluding other possible forms of internal representations (Pylyshyn 1973). On the other hand, some theorists maintained that the mind makes use of multiple forms of internal representation. The central issue is whether the image representation used in information processing is abstract and language-like (propositional) or percept-like and quasi-pictorial (depictive). These theorists have collected much evidence for maintaining that mental imagery is a separate medium of thought, which preserves the spatial structure of pictures (Kosslyn 1980, 1994). Although thought does not rely exclusively on imagery, imagery does play a role in thought. In the studies conducted by Shepard and Cooper (1982) and Kosslyn (1980), it was found the that subject's response time with respect to imagery increase as a function of the amount that an object must be transformed, zoomed in or scanned. Such evidence led Kosslyn (1975) to propose a distinct analogue sub-system, the visual buffer, as the store house of internal representations that do not describe shape but rather depict shape. In other words, each part of the depictive representation corresponds to some part of the object or scene being depicted; and the distances between the representations of the parts preserve the distances between the parts themselves. The visual buffer is a spatial structure that supports such representation. Various processes access perceptual memory and reconstruct the appearance of an object in the visual buffer. After reconstruction, the shape can be reinterpreted and manipulated in various ways. The depicting representations do not have an inherent truth-content unlike proposition; these are modality-specific (propositions are *a-modal*), not formed according to syntax, and are inherently ambiguous.

Theories of imagery

Three types of imagery theory are available in the Cognitive Science literature. These are : (1) *Picture theory*: this theory has a very long history that can be traced back to Plato or even Democritus (Thomas, 1987). The supporters of this theory hold that having visual imagery involves having entities, in the head or in the mind, which are functionally equivalent to inner pictures. These pictures are thought to be composed of copies or remnants of previous sense impressions or complexes of visual sensations, which are themselves picture-like. We may also note here the contemporary *Quasi-Pictorial* theory or the computational version of picture theory. Tye (1991) has demonstrated that the assumption, *computational data structure of some kind is appropriate model for conscious and intentionalistic mental content* is coherent. Kosslyn implicitly shares this assumption with the descriptionists (which we will discuss next). Most of the discussion in cognitive theory mixes up the notion of mental content (intentional content) with the notion of computational presentation. The above-mentioned assumption is popularly known as *Computational Mentalism* (CM). This dogma is mingled up with the view that brain function may best be understood and simulated computationally. There are many supporters of CM, and as a matter of fact, it is the foundation of the information processing paradigm. This view holds that the task of a theory of perception is to give an account of how the information implicit in states of sense organs is converted into a canonically "mental" consciously available data format or formats (Thomas, 1999). Kosslyn differs from the descriptionists regarding the nature of format.

Kosslyn developed his theory considering an analogy with computer graphics. The basic form is given in figure 1 based on Kosslyn (1980 p.6). The long term memory contains data from which images are to be constructed. This he calls "deep representations". The structural descriptions are also almost similar to those of the descriptionists. However, these are not directly available to consciousness. Kosslyn draws an analogy between files that contain data from a computer graphic program on the basis of which actual viewpoint pictures are constructed on the computer CRT monitor. Kosslyn's theory is based on this CRT metaphor. He holds that surface representation or quasi-pictures are constructed on the basis of the information in deep representations. A functionally defined neural locus is the place, which he calls *visual buffer*, where construction takes place. After the formation of the quasi-picture, it is available to consciousness as an image. Information that was available implicitly in the deep representation (in the given example, pointedness of the fox's ear) can be extracted through ''mind's eye function''. Unlike seeing, this function is needed to read and interpret the buffer's ''surface display''. Kosslyn (1994) explicitly identified visual buffer as being composed out of several retinotopic maps in the brain's occipital cortex. This claim is, however, controversial. This neuro-physiological controversy however does not disprove the feasibility of Kosslyn's thesis. The root of the controversy with Kosslyn's theory centres on forming a workable computer model of imagery. It is important to note that the images of Kosslyn's theory are quasi-pictures or functional pictures rather than pictures in a literal sense. The array representation in the computer is not actually visible. It is to be emphasized that the core commitment of the quasi-pictorialist research program is not to any particular details of implementation, but to the array representation for the image itself; and to something resembling the functional organization of fig.-1.


Visual Buffer
"MIND'S EYE INTERPRETIVE FUNCTION"
(shape; lines slanted? Meet point? Curved?)
SPATIAL DISPLAY "SURFACE REPRESENTATION"
Eye
LONG-TERM MEMORY "DEEP REPRESENTATION"
(write (line, curve) at location (x,y) to location (p,q)...)

Figure 1

(2) *Description theory*: this is popularly known as "propositional theory", because the data structures that it takes to embody mental images are regarded as expressing propositions describing the relevant perceptual scene. The main focus of this theory is to show that language-like representations are sufficient to account for all genuinely cognitive processes, including the experimental effects attributed to imagery. The principal advocates of description theory explicitly and strongly hold the view that this conception of inner 'notation' through which thoughts are written in the mind should be understood quite literally and realistically (Pylyshyn 1991). The description theorists consider the content of the representations involved in imagery to be perceptual, but they consider that there is nothing specifically perceptual about their format. This format does not differ from that of the representations underlying other cognitive processes. No specifically perceptual mechanism need be active when imagery is experienced (Pylyshyn, 1978, 1984).

(3) *Perceptual activity theory* : Recent work on both robotic and human vision (as well as perception in general) is converging on the idea that perception is not best understood as processing of sensory input into a detailed inner representation—be it description or depiction, but rather as an ongoing directed explorative activity (Landy et al, 1996, O'Regan and Noe, 2001). According to this view, since our brains direct all the minutest details of our ongoing behaviour including the exploratory perceptual activity itself, they need a constant stream of answers to specific questions about the detailed disposition of the environment. Information is thus sought by deploying sense-organs like measuring instruments in order to obtain answers from the environment, whenever they are needed. In order to explain how brain coordinates this activity, we may need to invoke data structures in the brain. They would not be descriptions or depictions of the environment, but rather the procedures that most appropriately direct its exploration. Thomas (1999) proposes that imagery experience is best explained with the help of perceptual activity which he calls "going-through-the-motion" of exploring objects or situations that are not actually there to be explored, under the control of an appropriate procedural representation.

Function of imagery

Ancient Greeks discovered a method of memorizing list of objects using imagery relying on the idea that thought relies on a collection of mental images. The *method of loci* was popularly in use even during the time of Aristotle. In modern day technology, computers are creating virtual situations, and allowing people to improve their reasoning or sensory motor skills in facing real life situation with the help of images and pictures.

One of the main functions of imagery is to help reasoning and solving problems by allowing predicting of the outcome of a given action, especially actions that involve the imagined movement of objects or the observer. Say for example, while in a furniture shop, one visualizes which piece suits best in which space of one's room. Here, the observer uses mental imagery in order to solve the problem. A surgeon mentally preparing himself for operation essentially contemplates on the bodily organ and its surrounding on which the operation is to be conducted; and an architect, while improving upon his construction assignment, manipulates the imagery to create the most elegant structure. It need be emphasized that only some visual predicates are particularly easily computed by the visual architecture. Numerous inferences are there for which there is information directly available in the diagram, say for example, of the two complicated shapes, which one has a smaller area without additional measurement and computation. However, the visual system may not be necessarily efficient in considering such situations. This explains the role of diagrams in problems that are essentially spatial, say for example, geometric problems. Diagrams enable detection of new visual information by allowing additional constructions. In addition, symbolic annotations can be made on the diagram, which enable a new set of inferences not by visual perception only, but by use of information in the conceptual modality.

Distinction between imagery and language

The difference between imagery and language is that the manner of relation of objects is absent in language, whereas the manner of relation of objects is completely determined in imagery. Say for example, when someone says 'my kitten is sitting under the table', the size and shape of the table, the size of the kitten, the bodily posture of the kitten and the proportion of the kitten to the table remain unaddressed. Depending on the degree of our imagery skill, we fill the concrete characteristics of the object, the shape and colour of the kitten etc. with respect to the table. The spatial relationship of the kitten to the table does not exist without the explicit specification provided by the preposition 'under'. It is here that the notion of freedom in the form of imagination enters into language. In this sense, the relationship between the words and their meanings is completely arbitrary. Literature provides us with descriptive pieces in abundance, which we make lively by suitably using imagination. The more the description includes aboutness of objects, the more vivid is the picture.

Conclusion

Depending on the information, one may rely upon either of the two representations. For example, in answering the question, 'are men rational?' one would look for the linguistic representation of information associated with men. On the other hand, in answering the question, 'which is smaller, robin or kingfisher?' one would take help of the images of robin and kingfisher. Such distinctions led Paivio (1979) and colleagues to hypothesize that information is encoded in two forms, as images and as words. Barbara Tverski and her colleagues as well as Mishel Denis and his colleagues have shown that representation of scenes constructed from verbal descriptions tend to preserve the spatial relationship occurring in the scene. The time it took subjects to indicate the relative locations of objects described in a text clearly indicates the imagined position in the scene. The projection of images as was discussed in the context of visual illusion clearly supports the existence of visual imagery. By aiding reasoning and problem solving by forecasting outcome of action, imagery holds an indispensable role in our cognitive activity vis-a-vis language.

In the course of our future research, we aim to show the relation between imagery and visual illusion.

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THE SELF

Roma Chakraborty

There are few subjects in philosophy which are more interesting or intriguing than a discussion on self. The word 'Self' is not a common one in ordinary language. We are, however, more familiar with its reflexive form—such as 'myself', 'yourself', 'himself' and so on. Earlier philosophers wrote about the 'soul', a term with certain theological overtones. Then, a term which is often interchangeably used with the 'self' is 'mind'. Yet again another term which has gained considerable acceptance, especially in Post-Cartesian Philosophy, is the concept of 'person', a term having some existential import. However, unless otherwise mentioned in this paper, I would take the concept of self in a general sense to imply the individual to which we attribute thoughts, beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, memories, sensations and intentional actions together with responsibility for those actions.

In this paper, I would like to trace the development of the concept of 'self' from the period of early Greek philosophy to the contermporary times in Western Philosophy. No doubt this is a very ambitious project, for this development covers a period of several centuries which I cannot hope to do justice to in a short paper. Moreover, questions may be raised that in the 20th century, when it might seem that issues about the nature of mind or self are best left to the scientists rather than philosophers, how could the views of Pre-Socratic philosophers, Aristotle, Descartes or Kant possibly contribute to the understanding of problems like artificial intelligence or brain imaging? Again, what relevance could such views have in the post-modernist conception of self?

Without going into great details, I would like to note how the views of many of these philosophers, ancient, medieval, and modern, provide essential insights into contemporary questions about the mind or self.

The concept of self has a long history. The ancient Hebrews, one of the earliest people to formulate such a concept, took the 'soul' to be whatever was in a body, which made it alive, made it a living thing rather than a dead thing. They used the Hebrew word for 'breath' to refer to the 'soul', because it was an important sign of life.

If we look at Homer's epics, we find that the soul or *psuchê* is closely connected with 'breath', which at death departs like a puff of smoke. Human beings have souls as long as they are alive, and souls leave them when they die. But the soul does not perish when a human being dies; it only continues as a flitting shade, has some shadowy existence, in the realm of the dead (Hades).

From these few Homeric remarks on the soul, we can gather some idea of the background to early Greek philosophical thought.

First, human beings have souls as they are alive.

Second, the soul is the principle of life, for it marks the difference between the living and the non-living.

Third, the soul is separable from the body, something that could continue to exist when the body dies. Death is only the withdrawal of the animating force from the body.

Bearing these assumptions in mind, we can explain why Thales, the founding father of Western Philosophy, took souls to be present in all sorts of things, including those that we would not normally count as alive. In a human being or animal, the soul in the originator of change or the cause of motion. Since human beings and animals are capable of change or movement, as long as they are alive, they have souls. Thales however, generalizes this view further; suggesting that magnets, since they move iron and, therefore, induce movement in them, should be 'classed' as alive along with human beings and animals. Self-movement, then, is taken to be the criterial sign of life.

We find that while Thales, the founding father of Western philosophy, considers soul as the originator of change, the later Milesians, too, attend to the features of soul as well. Anaximenes, for example, claims that as wind and air enclose the whole world, so our *psuchê*, being air, the principle of life, holds us together and controls us. Here we find a striking tendency among the ancient philosophers to explain the nature of the *psuchê* in terms of the elements which they took to constitute the physical world as a whole.

Heraclitus continues and develops this theme of macro-microcosm. He identifies the soul with cosmic reason (*logos*) that guides the universe. That is why he regards the soul as the fire, making the latter a primary component of the universe. There is, he says, a world-controlling '*logos*', that one wise, which is comparable to Zeus in its eternity, knowledge and power. Within the individual, too, '*logos*' is a principle of control and understanding. This divine principle is identifiable with the physical structure of the world in terms of ever-living, intelligent and all-controlling 'fire', and takes its place in the cycle of changes of the world masses, while remaining the standard by which these changes are regulated. These changes occur on the microcosmic scale within the individual, from fiery *psuchê* through water to earth and back through water to fiery *psuchê*. As with the cosmos, the principle of fire guides and controls the result that "dry soul is wisest and best." [The drunkard, he says, has no control over his body, because his soul is wet.]

For a pluralist like Democritus, the world is not based on any one element or order (water, air or fire), but consists of a number of atoms, but having one distinctive feature in common, namely, that they cannot be further divided— i.e., *a-tomos*. He believes that the *psuchê*, since it initiates change without any external stimulant, must be constituted by the most mobile atoms. In fact, he suggests that it is composed of especially fine spherical atoms in constant motion.

In contrast with these early attempts to reduce psychology to physics, (i.e., to provide materialistic explanation of the *psuchê* or the soul), we find some other Pre-Socratic thinkers who believed that the *psuchê* requires explanation in its own terms. So Anaxogoras (in fifth century B.C.), while still treating his psychic principle '*nous*' as material substance, refuses to identify it with any other type of matter. To him, just as the cosmic '*nous*' controls greater things, so also, '*nous*' on a smaller scale, physically controls the individual body, and is present in it as the intellectual principle. More interesting, perhaps, is the thesis of the Pythagoreans (in sixth century B.C), who hold that the *psuchê* is not a type of substance at all, but is a particular condition of the body, its attunement or harmony. On this view, since the essence of the world is found in 'number', the 'soul' too, is a number (expressible as a ratio of its component parts). However, the name of the Pythagoreans is associated, above all, with the doctrine of reincarnation of the 'soul' until its sins are expiated.

Our finding about the Pre-Socratic philosophers may thus be briefly summed up:

First, with the exception of thinkers like Empedocles and Democritus, who perceived no underlying order but just endless conflict, there is an insistence by these ancient thinkers on unity, whether it be the insistence on a single, fundamental element as in the Milesians, or the underlying unity of the '*logos*' as in Heraclitus. Pythagoras's emphasis on harmony, too, points in that direction.

Second, modern materialist models of mind seem, in a very broad sense, to be anticipated in Pre-Socratic thinking (without relevant neurophysiological facts).

Turning now to Socrates, who is regarded as the 'first philosoper', we notice a dramatic change. From the materialist concept of soul, we come to one that is indeterminate and open-ended. This is not clearly a religious concept, nor does it seem to presuppose metaphysical or theological doctrines. Again, it does not seem to involve any naturalistic or physical commiments such as the Pre-Socratic view that the soul is animating 'breath'. Such questions about soul are, according to Socrates, irrelevant to his claims about the nature and importance of the soul. His concerns. however, are strictly ethical, and he emphasizes the moral importance of the 'soul'. He contrasts virtue, understood as 'health of the soul' with the 'health of the body' because, he suggests that, I myself am more important than what belongs to me; and my beliefs, choices, and character are parts of myself more properly than my heart, arms or legs are. Thus, Socrates seems to believe in ideals which define virtue and determine the worth of one's soul. He seems to accept the natural belief about immortality and responsibility.

His faithful and ardent student, Plato, is probably the first Greek thinker to articulate a proper theory of the soul. Two of the main ideas on which his thinking on the subject is based are (1) the traditional notion that the souls of the dead are in Hades (i.e., they continue in existence); (2) the idea of a fundamental contrast between 'soul' on the one hand and 'body' on the other. As regards (1), Plato in the '*Phædo*' makes his most serious effort and urges for a conception of the soul that justifies Socrates's moral claims about the importance of the soul, as well as explains how immortality of the soul is possible. At the end of the dialogue, Socrates tells Crito that the corpse he will bury will not be Socrates—that Socrates himself survives his death even though his body decays.

As regards (2), Plato reverts to treating the *psuchê* as a substance, and abandons the attempt to explain it in material terms. His arguments for the incorporeality of the *psuchê* are different from those which Descartes later employs. Plato does not focus, as Descartes does, on the contrast between the indubitability of subjective experience and the doubtfulness of the existence of matter; rather what tends to concern him is the cognitive and kinetic nature of the *psuchê* in contrast to the inertness of the body. In the '*Laws*', he argues that since the *psuchê* is self-moving, it must be prior to the body, which can only be moved by something else. However, in the '*Phædo*', the *psuchê* is treated as being essentially an intellectual faculty marked only by its quest for truth—all the other states are assigned to the body. By the time of the '*Republic*', Plato abandons his commitment to the doctrine propounded in *Phaedo*, to the non-composite nature of the *psuchê* and allows desire to constitute a part of it, along with reason and spirit; and thus, by reaching this tri-partite *psuchê*, Plato arrives at the notion of an 'integrated subject'.

Rejecting Plato's attempt to explain the nature of the *psuchê* as an immaterial substance, Aristotle pays special attention to the relation between *psuchê* and the body. For him, the essence of the *psuchê* is the principle of 'life'. Although Aristotle speaks of a hierarchy of souls—vegetative (having the capacities of growth, decay and reproduction), sensitive (with capacities of perception, belief and desire) and rational (with capacity of thinking), his fundamental thesis is that the *psuchê* is the 'form' of a living body, as opposed to its matter. In line with his general theory of form and matter, the soul stands to the body, as vision to the eye capable of seeing. Being the form, the soul is a substance; because it does not depend on any material body, and is not, therefore, corporeal. But the *psuchê*, Aristotle insists, is not an incorporeal substance like the Platonic soul, and the inseparability of soul and body must be a matter of not physical but logical impossibility. Thus, while the body cannot survive the loss of soul, there cannot also be any question of the immortality of the soul.

In his '*De Anima*', the soul is treated as truly a '*form*', beginning with and ceasing to be with the body. This insistence seems to have led some philosophers to assume that his view can be regarded as a form of 'functionalism'. Surely, '*form*' in Aristotle does not mean the same as it has been ordinarily understood.

After Aristotle, the Hellenistic philosophers reverted to a less nuanced materialism. Epicurus, like Democritus, espoused an atomic theory; and tried to explain the *psuchê* as a fundamental unity, a blend consisting of four kinds of atoms—fire-like, air-like, wind-like and nameless atoms having the power of perception. Both Epicurus and Stoics object to the *psuchê* being immaterial on the ground that this would make it causally inert. The Stoics, however, identify it with *pneuma* (breath) in an organism.

St. Thomas Aquinas tries to synthesize the two traditions of Plato and Aristotle. Working within an Aristotelian framework, he allows for a hierarchy of souls, and regards the rational soul to be both incorporeal and subsistent.

With Descartes, we enter what is philosophically speaking the modern world. His importance for us lies in the fact that it was he who did much to shape the framework within which subsequent discussions of the problem of mind (self) and body have been conducted. Having reached his rock bottom certainty in the proposition 'I think, therefore I exist', he asks what he is. His conclusion is that he is a substance, the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that, for its existence, it does not depend on any material thing. He then goes on to state that a person is a coupling of two different and independent substances; mind and body, the former being characterized by thought or consciousness, and the latter, by extension. Since a substance is defined as that which is completely self-contained, the question of how mind and body interact is perplexing. Descartes himself acknowledged this as a major difficulty, and tried in a manner as bold as it is bizarre (namely in terms of pineal gland) to meet it.

Descartes's emphasis on what is called 'subjectivity'—which refers to 'first-person standpoint' is a powerful defense of individual authority and autonomy, and is distinctively Cartesian. In fact, this dualism of mind and body is the product of a long tradition of Catholic thought, the progress of science, and the new-found respect for individual autonomy. But with Ryle's objection that Descartes's dualism commits a conceptual mistake and the difficulty involved in counting selves or individuating one self from another, Cartesian dualism seems to have now fallen into disfavour.

The influence and fascination of the Cartesian approach to self/mind allured many philosophers. These philosophers, being united by their faith in reason, accepted dualism of mind and body; but differed as to the nature of this dualism—yielding theories like

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property dualism, psycho-physical parallelism and epiphenomenalism. Among these, the *first view*, which owes its origin to Spinoza's double-aspect theory, treads a middle path between radical materialism and strong dualism. Its present form can be seen in P.F. Strawson's concept of person as a primitive concept, having mental as well as physical properties, which are distinct in kind. The *second view*, which dates back to Leibniz, holds that the soul and the body are like two clocks synchronized by God, so that appropriate correlations occur between mental and physical events. There is a certain adhocness about this view, since it requires the intervention of God to set things right. The *third theory*, which holds that our mental states have physical causes, but are themselves causally sterile, seems incredible, for it is utterly preposterous to urge that my ideas and decisions have no influence on my behaviour.

With the rise of science and its emerging victory over the authority of the Church, Europe entered into a celebration of a new faith, the faith in reason. This so-called Enlightenment emerged first in England following fast on the scientific achievements of Newton and political changes of the glorious revolution at the end of the 17th century. The empiricist philosophers, Locke, Berkeley and Hume belong to the age of Enlightenment.

Now, on a strict empiricist view, the concept of substantiality is a redundant one. John Locke, though being an empiricist, retains this concept in a watered-down version. While discussing about personal identity, Locke concludes that the problem concerns the identity of some elusive (probably incorporeal but possibly corporeal) thinking thing. He then provides an analysis of personal identity in terms of consciousness (memory). Locke thus shares the Cartesian view of a person as a substance having thinking as its quality.

However, it was Hume who denied the applicability of the concept of substance in its last stronghold, the self. The starting point of this serialist or phenomenalist view is Hume's claim that all ideas are traceable to preceding impressions. While examining the idea of causality, and finding no impression revealing it, he carries out a similar examination in the case of self. As far as tracing our idea of the self to an impression is concerned, he can find no such impression. The self, for him, is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions connected together by the laws of association (resemblance, contiguity or causation) which presume habit of thought. In this way, Hume hits upon an important characteristic of the self, hitherto ignored by the rationalists, namely, its temporality. However, serial or bundle theories of the self face two difficulties. **First**, it seems not to make sense to speak of thoughts as loose and separate without anyone to have them. **Second**, there seems to be no string capable of tying the bundles of experiences together, keeping one bundle distinct and distinguishable from another. Once the impossibility of using memory as a string is realized, the difficulty appears "too hard for my understanding", as Hume confessed.

William James, being as convinced as Hume as to the temporal character of the "stream of consciousness", offers the supplementary hypothesis that a certain qualitative modification is handed on from one event to the next and so on. In other words, James refuses to segment subjective life in the way in which Hume had done it. For James, there can be relations between discrete terms in a series, and he speaks of impressional as well an non-impressional thinking. This is comparable to the 'resting places' and 'flights' of a bird's life. The former he calls the, 'substantive parts' and the latter, the transitive parts, of the stream of consciousness.

Ayer's phenomenalism draws on three sources : the Humean reduction of selves to sense-contents, behaviourism and Russell's theory of logical constructions. For Ayer, Hume's view is mistaken, for he admits that he is unable to discover the principle of connection between perceptions which, by defining the unity problem, constitutes a single self. Ayer tries to solve this problem in terms of bodily identity, i.e., in terms of resemblance and continuity of sense-contents. However, while this kind of reductionism in terms of sense-contents falls prey to certain solipsistic tendencies, reductionism in terms of bodily behaviour is open to the serious objection that much of human life is not 'manifested' in overt behaviour at all. In this respect, the account given by Ryle about the part played by behaviour and dispositions to behaviour in accounting for our mental life may be said to be an improvement upon Ayer's view. But Ryle's dispositional account is also open to the serious objections that (1) if mental states, which are supposed to cause behaviour, are themselves behavioural or behavioural dispositions, how could they do the job assigned to them? (2) No mental state could be defined by a single range of dispositions independent of other mental states. (Chisholm & Geach).

So, although it seems that we have emancipated ourselves from the beguiling errors of Descartes, (i.e., got rid of the 'ghost' in the machine called body), the problem still persists, viz., what is the nature of the mind or self, and how it is related to the body?

One form of attack against the Cartesian subjectivity found expression in Ryle's view. The second line of attack on it we find in Kant and Hegel, whose views have a definite impact on the present day philosophy. A third line of attack can be traced in existentialist philosophy, which rejects any dualism regarding mind and body, between subject and object, and above all, the linguistic separation of consciousness, experience and mind. To assure the neutrality of this starting point, to ensure that we do not fall into the language of Descartes, Heidegger suggests a new term "*Dasein*" (literally means 'being there'), as the name of this being from whose perspective all of this is described. *Dasein* is not a consciousness or a mind, nor is it a person; but again it is inseparable from the world of which it is aware. *Dasein* is simply "Being-in-the-World", which, Heidegger insists, is a unitary phenomenon. Thus, Heidegger, for instance, defends an uncompromising holism in which the self cannot be as it was for Descartes, viz. a thinking thing, which is distinct from the body. That self is merely the 'roles' that other people cast on me, and that self, the *Das Mann* is, therefore, a social construction.

By using the word 'person' rather than 'self', the existentialist suggests that man is not only a being who tries to know, but one who feels as well as acts. Man's significant relation lies not in his relation to the external world, but in his relations to his fellow-beings.

We now turn to Kant, the most illustrious German champion of the Enlightenment, who was awakened from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume's scepticism.

Insisting that metaphysics is inescapable, Kant summarizes three metaphysical questions which the human mind finds unavoidable—namely, God, freedom and immortality—along with questions about the nature of the self, substantiality, space and time, mathematics, geometry and religion.

The central thesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is that knowledge of the world is possible, because the self—the transcendental self or ego—determines the structure of our every experience; that it is we ourselves who give form to the world. We know the world not because our experience corresponds to external reality, but because reality must conform to the structures of the mind. Thus, for there being any experience or knowledge whatsoever, one has to assume the existence of a self (the transcendental ego) that has these experiences and understands them. The unity of our experience can only be explained through transcendental necessity—what Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception. Taking the possibility of 'I think' accompanying all our experiences as its first premise, Kant goes further to assume that this transcendental ego is itself one source of our experiences, and as such, while it is the condition for the existence of the world, yet it itself is never experienced.

There is however, the more ordinary conception of oneself as a person, as an embodied, emotional intelligence that has features, friends. history, culture and context. This is the empirical self, which is known like anything else in the world through experience.

But to be human is not just to know, it is also to do. Kant distinguishes between the world of knowledge and the world of action, between ourselves as knowers and as actors. In his Second Critique (*Critique of Practical Reason*) Kant brings closer the distinction which he had earlier (in the first critique) drawn between the world as 'phenomenon'—the world as it is constituted and experienced and as 'noumenon' or the 'world as it is in itself'; and gives the noumenon a dramatic role. For it is the self as noumenon—that is, the ultimate agent, which accounts for the immortality of the soul. Kant defends his two-world view, claiming that his notion of the acting self as noumenon is no mere residue of any prior metaphysics—it is essential to his view of morality, to the very possibility of moral responsibility.

Kant has revolutionized the anthropocentric urge that had been present in Western philosophy since Socrates. He has promoted the subject or self to a position of the highest epistmological and moral importance. But in doing so, Kant seems to transfer or displace the privileges of the invididual subject to the transcendental subject; for this was his response to rescue philosophy from utter subjectivism. This results in a subtle intellectual decentering of the subject.

Further decentering of the subject occurs in Hegel, who historicizes and collectivizes the Kantian subject. For Hegel, selfhood develops not through introspection, but through mutual recognition.

That is, the self is essentially social, not merely psychological or epistemological. Through an ongoing dialectic, where we are led through various philosophical strategies for coping with and evading the difficulties of life, we finally get to 'Spirit' (*Geist*). This 'Spirit' for Hegel is the cosmic soul that encompasses all of us—it is the unit of humanity and the human world, which includes the world of nature as the object of knowledge. Ultimately, we are all one Spirit, and recognizing this all important truth is the absolute end of Hegel's philosophy. This ultimate truth or the Absolute is the historical culmination of Hegel's dialectic, and it is for him the end of history. (Politically, the end of dialectic is freedom, not just freedom from constraint but freedom to be ourselves).

One implication of the Hegelian system is its extremely diminished *role* for the individual or the subject. For Hegel, only the larger picture matters, and within that picture, the individual or the subject counts for very little.

Before turning to the view towards which this intellectual decentering of subject leads us, let us take a glimpse of the advances that have been made in the 'brain sciences' in the recent decade. The thesis that mental life is entirely dependent on the states and condition of the brain can be traced to the ancient Greek physicians like Hippocrates and Galen (400 B.C), who suggest that 'men ought to know that from the brain and from the brain only arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and jests as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs and tears' ('physiological bases of our experience').

The culmination of the broad materialisitic perspective on mind/brain relations is the entire elimination of the mind. Two defences of this position are Identity thesis and Eliminative Materialism. Unlike the Identity theorist, who would preserve the vocabulary and explanation of folk psychology, joining them by identity relations to the actual brain states to which they refer, the eliminativists seek to eliminate them entirely. These philosophers not only deny that there are such things as mental states, but advocate expunging all psychological and mental terms from our vocabulary, replacing them by terms drawn from the sciences, especially computational and cognitive sciences.

Many philosophers and researchers in cognitive science and artificial intelligence have proposed that the functional equivalence betwen human mental processes and what computers can or might do is much deeper than just sensory input and behavioural output relations with an external environment. They claim that what intervenes between input and output, what goes on inside the brains of humans and other animals, is computation.

We now arrive at what may be called the last lap of our historical survey. Post-modernism in philosophy is an attack not only on the pretensions but also on the premises and presuppositions of modernism. The subject or consciousness, which the Cartesians developed and defended as being the necessary nature of human subject, is considered in post-modernism as not essential at all, but something that might be constructed, something created by culture and language or even imagined. The Post-modernists have argued that there is 'really, no subject, no consciousness, no freedom', just an 'interplay of forces' and our 'selves' are nothing but the 'tentative juncture of these forces.'

So, herein lies the story of the self—its evolution, its decentering or displacement, and finally, its disappearance.

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AYAM AHAM ASMĪTI: SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDENTITY IN CHĀNDOGYA-UPANIṢAD 8.7-12

Daniel Raveh

The Story of Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati from the eighth chapter of the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* is well-known. In the following lines I would like to offer a close reading of the story, focusing on the last two of the four states of consciousness discused by the *Upaniṣadkāra*, i.e. *suṣupti* (or *suptam*) and *turīya*, 'deep sleep' and 'transcendental consciousness' respectively[1]. My contention is that the treatment of these two concepts in the abovementioned story is unique, and differs from the manner in which they are usually treated in the long Advaitic tradition. I will argue that the term *suṣupti* refers to a state in which not merely the world has faded awas, but even one's own self; to a consciousness-state lacking not merely objective content but even subjectivity of any kind; to a state in which there is no world, no subject to perceive the world; and most importantly, as far as the present discussion is concerned, no reflection, no self-consciousness. In *suṣupti*, as depicted in the Indra-Virocana-Prajāpati story, not merely the 'flesh eyes' looking without are shut, but also 'the third eye' looking within. Altogether different from *suṣupti* is *turīya*; I will further argue that in the fourth state of consciousness, as sketched here, the 'computer' (consciousness) which has been previously 'turned-off' is 'restarted'. Now, the world, which had existed in the *jāgrat* (waking) state, somehow faded in the *svapna* (dream) state and totally disappeared in *suṣupti*, reappears. The world reappears, but its status radically changes due to the fact that the outer phenomenal gaze (of the 'flesh eyes') is now accompanied by an inward-gaze (symbolized by the 'third eye') or by what we may call self-reflection. A person in a state of *turīya*, we shall discover together, is portrayed by the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-kāra* both as enjoying 'women (or to modernize the *Upaniṣadic* text, partners of whatever sex), carriages and relatives' (*strībhir vā yānair vā jñātibhir vā*)[2], and as realizing '*ayam aham asmīti*' ('This is me!')[3]. This unique *Upaniṣadic* phrase brings into our picture Śaṅkara, the renowned exponent of the famous *mahāvākya 'tat tvam asi'*, which is none but a second person phrasing of '*Ayam aham asmīti*'. Drawing on Śaṅkara's *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya*, I will depict the latter phrase as encapsulating the notion of self-consciousness which constitutes, according to my reading, the essential difference between *suṣupti* and *turīya.* If *suṣupti* is conventionally considered as one step short of *turīya*; as 'almost-*turīya*' or 'nearly-*turīya*'; here it is depicted not as one step short of—but rather as two steps past the fourth, longed for, liberative state of consicousness. A person in a state of 'deep sleep', it is suggested in the story under discussion, has gone too far and needs to 'come back' to what is called here '*turīya*'. If we have become accustomed to thinking of *turīya* as a state of no pain, no pleasure, no qualities, nothing—or so the Advaitic tradition has been telling us time and again; then here, in the eighth chapter of the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*, we shall encounter in altogether different notion of *turīya*, consisting simultaneously of an outer, phenomenal, '*vyavahāric*' dimension and of an inward, self-conscious reflection.

To make a long story short, the episode from the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* tells of Indra and Virocana, the representative of the *devas* and the ambassador of the *asuras* respectively, who respond to a challenge set by Prajāpati; and come forward to discover 'the *ātman* that is free from evils, free from old age and death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and thirst; the *ātman* whose desires and intentions are real'.[4] Interestingly, the *ātman* is depicted not merely *via negativa*, as being free from old age, death etc. but also positively as '*satyakāmaḥ*' and '*satya-saṁkalpaḥ*'. In any case, the *deva* and the *asura* have in fact come for the *ātmavid's* trophy as depicted, even promised, by Prajāpati, i.e. obtaining all the worlds and fulfilling every desire. His teaching is fourfold; four times he gives instructions (*upaniṣads*) concerning the nature of the *ātman*; Virocana is satisfied with the first instruction and returns to the *asuras*. Hence after, says the *Upaniṣad-kāra*, since he and his fellow-*asuras* have adopted a misconception (let us postpone dealing with the question whether he and Indra have been purposely misled or rather misunderstood their *guru's* instruction)[5], whoever believes that the *ātman* is merely the body as Virocana has, deserves 'even today' to be considered an '*asura*' ('demon'). Indra was not satisfied with Prajāpati's first instruction, and returned to him to receive three further instructions. Again he was not satisfied with a second and a third instructions, and merely after 101 years at the feet of his *guru*, upon hearing the fourth instruction, he finally grasped the true nature of the *ātman*, or rather could finally see himself as none other than the *ātman.* In his first instruction, Prajāpati points at the *ātman* as 'this person that one sees here in the eye'[6]; what does he mean? His students too do not understand, and he orders them to put on fancy clothes and look in the mirror. Carrying out his instruction, they come to the conclusion that the *ātman* is simply the body; but when they both leave (before Indra's return), the *guru* looks at them and reflects that they are leaving without cracking the riddle of their true identity.[7] As far as the present discussion is concerned, it may be said that in his first instruction, Prajāpati has pointed at (or ar least been understood as pointing at) the *jāgrat*, the waking state, as the 'arena' of the *ātman*. Indra could not accept this teaching, reflecting on the fact that the body might be injured and even die, contrary to Prajāpati's initial 'definition' of it; hence, his teacher offers him a second instruction, accroding to which the *ātman* is 'the one who goes happily about in a dream'[8]. Hence, the dream state (*svapna*) comes into the picture, and this time Indra is led to believe that the 'I' of the dream is the *ātman;* but not before long he reflects that just like the *jāgrat* 'I', he (or she) might be injured and even die. Therefore Prajāpati offers a third teaching, according to which 'when one is fast asleep, totally collected and serene, and sees no dreams—that is the *ātman*'[9]. Here, Indra is told that in a state of *supta*, usually taken as a synonym of (or at least as having close 'family resemblance' with) *suṣupti*, one is his true self, the *ātman.* What exactly is *supta* or *suṣupti*? The *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-kāra* defines it as '*samastaḥ samprasannaḥ svapnaṃ na vijānāti*', i.e. a state is which a person is '. *samastaḥ*, literally meaning 'thrown together', 'compounded', 'pervading the whole of anything', 'all, whole, entire'[10]; Olivelle, as we have seen, translates *samastaḥ* as 'totally collected'; Radhakrashnan prefers 'composed'[11]; why not opt for 'a state in which a person is a part of the whole'? If one is even to consider this linguistically plausible translation, then the question which immediately rises is why *suṣupti* cannot be regarded as *mokṣa*; I shall deal with this question later on.

2. *samprasannaḥ*, translated by Olivelle and Radhakrishnan alike as 'serene', which again leads to the question regarding *suṣupti* and *mokṣa*.

3. *svapnaṃ na vijānāti*, translated as '(a state in which a person) sees no dreams' (Olivelle) or 'knows no dream' (Radhakrishnan).

This description of *suṣupti* throws us deep into the psychology of dreams. A. Kanthamani (2005), for example, refers to recent discoverises in the research of sleep, according to which dreaming continues even in a Non-REM sleep, 'though it is dreaming of a distinct character'. His conclusion is clear and sharp : 'There is no empirical evidence for *suṣupti* or *turīya*. Dreamless sleep seems to be a misnomer when there is no such thing'. Interestingly, Kanthamini compares the *Upaniṣadic* 'sleep-laboratory' with its modern counterpart; yet, he must have not read the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad*, as *suṣupti* is defined here not as dreamless sleep, but rather as a state is which we do not see or do not have knowledge of dreaming. Whether dreaming of whatever kind does take place, be it REM or Non-REM dreaming, is not the focal point as far as the *Upaniṣadkāra* is concerned; he is not 'ontology-centered' but rather interested in epistemology; and from a mere epistemological perspective, *suṣupti* is 'dreamless, objectless, empty. Śaṅkara, in his commentary to *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.11.1, i.e. to Prajāpati's third instruction, refers not to *suṣupti* as such, but rather attempts to make sense of the instruction, namely to defend the statement that the *ātman* is to be found in this consciousness-state. For Śaṅkara, as we shall further see in greater detail, each of the four instructions is equally correct; for him, Prajāpati presents a single instruction, phrased and rephrased from different angles to point out at that which for him (for Śaṅkara) is the focal point of the story under discussion : the continuity of consciousness in all its states, continuity which reveals the all-pervasive presence of the *ātman* in every consciousness state.

To further touch on the nature of *suṣupti*, let us take a brief look at the third state of consciousness as depicted in the *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad*. 'Deep sleep', it is said here, 'is when a sleeping man entertains no desires and sees no dreams'[12]; hence, it is not merely a dreamless but also—even primarily—a desire-less state of consciousness. Are we to conclude, then, that dreams are merely the outcome of desire? Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* tries to convey the meaning of *suṣupti* by using the following illustration : In the darkness, the world of multiplicity fades away due to our incapability to differentiate; when differentiation is no more, or as Śaṅkara puts it: when *viveka* is replaced by *aviveka*—everything becomes *ekībhūta*, translated by Dave as 'unified mass'[13]. In *suṣupti* it is just the same: we lose our capability to differentiate, which is the principal element of both the waking and the dreaming states; hence, everything becomes '*prajñānaghana*', 'unified mass of consciousness'.[14] For Śaṅkara, then, it can be said that *jāgrat* is the 'day-state' of consciousness, *svapna* an intriguing 'twilight-state' and *suṣupti* the 'night-state' of consciousness; as such, as we have seen, *suṣupti* is taken by him to be an extremely fruitful illustration for the very notion of *advaita*. For Śaṅkara, Prajāpati's third instruction is as accurate as the first two instructions and even more, as it leads to the very core of his Advaitic teaching. We are yet to discover the essential difference between *suṣupti* and *turīya*, both at the *Upaniṣadic* level and in Śaṅkara's reading.

The question regarding the difference between *suṣupti* and *turīya*, or rather about the liberative aspect which differentiates *turīya* from *suṣupti* has been raised and dealt with—though in a different terminology—in the Yoga tradition. Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra* opens with the startling declaration about *yoga* as '*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*'.[15] Thereafter, the *Yogasūtra-kāra* specifies what he sees as the five *vṛttis* to be extinguished in the *yoga-process*, amongst which he mentions *nidrā*. Vyāsa, the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya-kāra*, explains[16] that *nidrā* includes both dreamful and dreamless slleep. Regarding the latter, i.e. dreamless sleep, the question arises as to why consider this consciousness-state as a *vṛtti* rather than *citta-vṛtti-nirodha*? Or to put it even more bluntly: Is not dreamless sleep the final goal of *yoga*, the soteriological 'destination' of the *yogin*? Vyāsa's answer[17] is negative, since upon waking up even from a dreamless sleep, one reports 'I have slept well' or 'slept poorly'. Since there is always some sort of recollection, even if vague and general, argues Vyāsa, we must conclude that dreamless sleep is not a state of absolute stillness of the mind. A similar standpoint, according to which *suṣupti* is not as final and irreversible as *turīya*, has also been the 'official' Advaitic position concerning the fundamental difference between these two consicousness-states. In *suṣupti*, explains Eliot Deutsch, 'distinctions are not abolished but are present in a kind of pure potentiality; and for this reason the *jīva* is said here to perceive pure *avidyā*'[18]. According to Deutsch, then, *suṣupti* is almost *turīya;* the next step would be to remove the crystal clear *avidyā* revealed in the dreamless sleep state and abolish for good the distinctions which for the time being have been merely suspended or 'put to sleep'. K.C. Bhattacharyya too depicts *suṣupti* as a step toward *turīya* or toward 'the objective possibility of an undifferenced concsiousness of the absolute'. According to him[19], 'The *suṣupti* state gives the possibility only but not the actuality of the knowledge of noumena; the self does not here swoon into the knowledge of noumena'. *Suṣupti* is further depicted by him as inferior than *turīya* in the sense that like a dream-state, it is a state in which the self has no control over itself, rather than 'a state to which the self rises by a continuous effort'. And finally, writes Bhattacharyya, in *suṣupti*, 'the self as always limited is simply isolated'; in *turīya*, 'it bursts its bonds, destroys the barrier between subject and object, and becomes absolute'.

A very different approach with regard to that which distinguishes *turīya* from *suṣupti* (or rather that which lacks in *suṣupti* compared to *turīya*) is presented in our story by the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-kāra* through Indra.

Having received his *guru's* third instruction, according to which the *ātman* is to be found in the *supta* (*suṣupti*) state, Indra heads back to the *devas*, but is suddenly taken by deep discontent with what he has just learned :

> But this self as just explained, you see, does not perceive itself fully as 'I am this'; it does not even know any of these things here. It has become completely annihilated. I see nothing worthwhile in this.[20]

According to Indra, *suṣupti* cannot be considered as the spiritual goal for which he sat under the feet of his *guru* for the last ninety-six years, since:

1. It is a non-reflective state; a state in which a person does not know oneslef.

1.1 The lacking self-reflection is encapsulated in the statement '*ayam aham asmīti*'.

2. Even the 'phenomenal gaze', the perception of things around oneself, is absent in this consciousness-state.

Let us start with Indra's second argument, namely the absence of the 'phenomenal gaze'; is it not a desired state? Is it not a state in which one is finally released form the duality inherent in our two-eye conventional gaze? Radhakrishnan attempts to solve this riddle, stating that 'Indra feels that if there are no objects of which we are conscious, even the subject becomes destroyed'.[21] Radhakrishnan's '*bhāṣya*' gives rise to a double problem : first, is not the subject/ object dichotomy the *mūla* duality to be overcome in a 'spiritual journey' such as the one depicted in the *Upaniṣadic* story? Second, does Indra really seek to find the 'subject'? Is the *ātman* a 'subject'? I would rather say that the *ātman* is a sort of 'meta-subject', transcending both subject and object. Therefore my own contention is that whereas the *ajña* is confined to the phenomenal-dual perspective, the *mukta* can see both the 'on the surface' phenomenal picture and the deeper-whole-*advaitic* picture, hidden within the first picture. Hence the *mukta* simultaneously looks within and without; not merely within but also without; the inner gaze affecting, in fact radically changing, the status of the outer-picture. Now, let us take a second look at Indra's first argument, about *suṣupta* lacking self-consciousness, i.e. lacking the reflection '*ayam aham asmīti*', vis-a-vis Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*. Self-reflection is an indispensable feature of Śaṅkara's notion of *ātmavidyā*. For the Advaitin, each of us is a 'knower' from the very beginnin, or rather *ātmavidyā* is 'in-built' in us, because *to know* the *ātman* is *to be* the *ātman*, which we all are, have always been and will always be. Hence for Śaṅkara, to be in *avidyā* is not to know that I know, not to realize that being the *ātman* I necessarily know, I am necessarily a *jñānin*. In his *Upadeśasāhasrī*, he depicts a conversation between *guru* and *śiṣya*, in which the former tells the latter:

> Though you are the highest *ātman* and not a *samsārī*, you hold the inverted view, 'I am a *samsārī*'. Though you are neither agent nor enjoyer, (you hold the inverted view, 'I am) an agent and an enjoyer'. *Though you know, (you hold the inverted view) 'I do not know'*— this is *avidyā*[22].

To be in *avidyā*, then, is not to acknowledge the fact that being the *ātman*, at the fundamental level, one is neither a *kartā nor bhoktā*, and moreover—that *ātmavidyā* is in me. The *śiṣya*'s task is 'to accomplish the accomplished'[23], to figure out that which is already there; the *guru's* task is to ceaselessly point out at student's 'ātmanhood' which he declines to see. The teacher's main didactic tool, as Śaṅkara sees it, is the *mahāvākya* '*tat tvam asi*' ('You are That!'); for him, the whole of the *śruti* is condensed within this single *Upaniṣadic* phrase, which he considers to be the very *pramāṇa of* *ātmavidyā*. '*Tat tvam asi*' is a second-person phrasing of Indra's own '*ayam aham asmīti*'[24], or rather Indra's statement is a first-person phrasing of what Śaṅkara sees as the principal Advaitic instruction; a first-person phrasing which can be taken to indicate that the Advaitic message conveyed in the teaching '*tat tvam asi*' has finally been assimilated. Interestingly, in his commentary to the story under discussion, Śaṅkara refers not to '*ayam aham asmīti*'/'tat tvam asi', but rather rephrases Indra's reservations concerning Prajāpati's third instruction as follows:

> When there is consciousness, the existence of the knower also becomes known, but not so when consciousness is not there. And a person in deep-sleep is not perceived to have consciousness.[25]

According to Śaṅkara, then, Indra indeed needs to spend more time with his teacher, since he has not captured the depth of the third instruction. For Śaṅkara, as I have already claimed, Prajāpati's instruction is both accurate and truthful, since the *ātman* prevails even in *suṣupti*. We have also seen that the '*advaitic*' nature of *suṣupti* as *prajñānaghana* is employed by the Advaitin as an especially fruitful illustration for the enduring nature of the *ātman*. Moreover, according to Śaṅkara, wherever the *ātman* is, *jñāna* (translated here by Swāmī Gambhīrānanda as 'consciousness') is! For him, as I have argued, 'to know' (in the metaphysical-ultimate sense of the word) is 'to be'. Hence, in rephrasing Indra, Śaṅkara does not claim that in *suṣupti*, consciousness exists not, but rather cautiously states that in a 'dreamless sleep', a person 'is not perceived' (*na dṛṣyate*) to have consciousness. For him, the whole point is to go beyond appearance to realize that even in the 'darkness' of *suṣupti*, there simply cannot be (logically, conceptually, even experientially) a break in the continuity of the *ātman*. Indra's main reservation, according to Śaṅkara, is that in 'dreamless sleep' the knower is not to be found. As far as the Advaitin is concerned, the *ātman* is not the 'knower', if this term refers to the person who perceives objects. The *ātman* is rather the 'person' behind the 'perceiving person' according to the *svataḥ-prakāśa-vāda* theory adopted by Śaṅkara, in each knowledge-episode there are always two 'participants': the perceiver of objects (the knower, the *pramātṛ*) and the *ātman* as a *sākṣin* ('witness'); for a matter of fact, merely the *pramātṛ* takes part in the actual process of knowing; the *sākṣin*, as the very term indicates, is inactively present. According to K.C. Bhattacharyya[26], in a state of 'dreamless sleep', not merely the *ātman* is present but even the 'knower', i.e. the perceiver of objects; hence according to him (through he does not specifically mention the story under discussion), Indra is simply wrong! Bhattacharyya's intriguing explanation is that in *suṣupti*, the consciousness still functions in a 'knowing of objects mode', but the 'object' perceived by it is merely a blank; or as he further puts it, *suṣupti* is 'the consciouness of a positive nothing'.

Going back to the *Upaniṣadic* story, Indra's double argument regarding *suṣupti* as blindness both at the level of the outward-gaze and at the level of self-reflection leads him to the conclusion that in 'deep sleep' the *ātman* is annihilated, rather then revealed. For him, them, *supta* is a state of destruction (*vināśa*), rathr than a liberative state. If according to Śankara, Indra's story is a narrative of continuation, even when it comes to the third consciouness-state; then as far as the *Upaniṣadkāra* is concerned, *suṣupti* brings about a break, a discontinuation. Unable to accept *suṣupti* as his 'final destination', as it seems to be contradictory to Prajāpati's initial declaration about the eternality of the *ātman*, Indra returns to the *gurukula* for another five years and a fourth instruction. Before turning to Prajāpati's final instruction about the *ātman* in the fourth state of consciouness, let us take a quick look at the picture of *turīya* as portrayed in the *Māṇḍūkaya-Upaniṣad*. Here, it is said that

> They consider the fourth to be that which is not concious of the internal world, nor conscious of the external world, nor conscious of both the worlds, nor a mass of consciouness; whicn is unseen, beyond empirical determination, beyond the grasp (of the mind), undemonstrable, unthinkable, indescribable, of the nature of consciouness alone wherein all phenomena cease, unchanging, peaceful and non-dual.[27]

Reading the *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad* we realize why *turīya*, literally 'the fourth' (state of consciouness), is called *turīya*; it cannot be given any other name, being above and beyond any positive description. We are told that it is neither consciousness of the internal world (as *svapna* is), nor of the external world (as *jāgrat* is); it is neither consciousness of both worlds (the waking and dream worlds), nor 'mass of consciousness' (*'prajñānaghanam'=suṣupti*); nor does it fall under any other category; in fact it is beyond the scope of language and thought; it is the cessation of *prapañca* (a 'twin-term' of *māyā*) and the culmination of *advaita*. Eliot Deutsch comments[28] that whereas *jāgrat* and *svapna* correspond to the phenomenal world; *suṣupti* corresponds to *savikalpa-samādhi* (bringing the Yoga tradition into the picture)[29] and the *saguṇa-brahman*; and *turīya* to *nirvikalpa-samādhi* and *nirguṇa-brahman*.

Prajāpati's final insruction to Indra, his '*turīya* instruction' is radically different from the conventional *turīya* picture as *nirvikalpa*, *nirguṇa*, nir-everything belonging to the realm of the known. The main features of his fourth and final instruction[30] are the following:

1. The body, he says, is mortal; hence it is merely the abode of the immortal (*amṛta*) and non-bodily (*aśarīra*) *ātman*. As long as one has a body he cannot be free from joy (*priya*) and sorrow (*apriya*).
2. The wind is bodiless, and so are the rain-cloud, lightening and thunder. 'Now, as these, after they rise up from the space up above and reach the highest light, emerge in their true nature, in this very same way, this deeply serene one, after he rises up from this body and reaches the highest light, emerges in his own true nature'[31].
3. He is 'the highest person' (*uttama-puruṣa*).
4. 'He roams about there, laughing, playing, and enjoying himself with women, carriages and relatives, without remembering the appendage that is this body'.[32]
5. The life-breath (*prāṇa*) is yoked to this body as a draft animal to a cart.

Let us sum-up and scrutinize the information we have so far received concerning the 'fourth state'. First, we have been told that in this state, one is bodiless. What does it mean to be bodiless? Are we talking of '*videha mukti*', liberation after-death, after the 'physical death' of the body? Or is it merely a change of attitude in the form of less or even non-identification with the body? Śaṅkara opts for the second option. 'For generating detachment (*vairāgya*)', he writes, 'there is the special mention, 'grasped by death', so that someone might become detached from identification with the body (*deha-*

abhimanato viraktaḥ) and desist from it. The word 'body' (*śarīra*) here implies the organs (*indriya*) and also the mind (*manas*) associated with it'.[33] Second, the *Upaniṣad-kāra* illustrates the lightness of a bodiless state, speaking of the wind, the clouds etc. He further sketches a picture of rising up from the body, reaching the 'highest light' and discovering one's true nature, one's *sva-rūpa*. He who has 'reached' is referred to as *uttama-puruṣa*. What does it mean 'to be there', to be an '*uttama-puruṣa*'? In a radical contrast to the endless negations in the *turīya*-picture of the *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad*, we are told that 'the highest person' plays around forgetful of his body. The fact that he forgets does not mean that the body is 'ontologically' dead, but rather that his attitude towards the 'abode of the *ātman*' has changed. One is no longer bound by the body, depicted here as a weighty burden. Correspondingly, he who identifies with the body is compared to a draft animal yoked to a heavy cart. The decription of the *uttama-puruṣa* is extremely lively and 'unbearably' human. Is it not the ultimate worldly, phenomenal pleasure, to enjoy women (men), carriages (cars, airplanes etc.) and relatives? To enjoy these things and forget the limitations of our human body which cannot, for example, fly in the air, though we do fly in 'modern carriages' called 'airplanes'? Does one need to sit under the feet of a master not less than 101 years, as Indra did, to realize that these are the real pleasures of life? Radhakrishnan cannot accept this happy description, hence quickly explains that 'the self enjoys these pleasures as an inward spectator only and does not identify itself with them'.[34] If it is merely about the 'inward-pleasure' of the uninvolved 'withness', why employ the illustration of women, carriages and relatives? Is it because these are the most difficult pleasures to be enjoyed merely 'inwardly'? In his reading, Radhakrishnan draws on Śaṅkara, who just like him refuses to read the text literally. The Advaitin explains that in a state of *aviayā*, one identifies with his body to the extent that he thinks of himself in terms of being the son of such and such person and believes that eventually he will die. He is to be enlightened (*pratibodhita*) through an instruction like Prajāpati's, rephrased by Śaṅkara as follows: 'Thou are not possessed of the qualities of the body and the organs, but rather Thou art That'.[35] Interestingly, since '*tàt tvam asi*' is taken by Śaṅkara to be the only remedy for *avidyā*, i.e. the sole *pramāṇa* of *ātmavidyā*, he cannot imagine a *guru-śiṣya* communication lacking this famous *mahāvākya*; hence, even Prajāpati, according to him, must have employed this indispensable didactic tool. As for the women-carriages-relatives, Śaṅkara explains[36] that even after being established in his *sva-rūpa*, one may still 'roam about' (*paryeti*), taking the forms of 'Indra and others', hence playing or sporting (*krīdan*) with things arising from mere desire (*saṃkalpādeva*) or with things from the *brahma-loka*, and enjoying (*ramamāṇaḥ*) with 'women etc.' (*stryādi*), yet 'merely through the mind' (*manasaiva*). Has not Śaṅkara previously argued that the 'body' which is to be forgotten in 'the fourth state' includes boty the *indriyas* and the *manas*? The striking feature about the 'women etc.' illustration lies not in its 'physicality', but rather in its 'worldliness'. We all know that the pleasure we experience with our partners, relatives, and yes, sometimes even 'carriages', can transcend (or rather should transcend) the mere-physical domain; yet the mention of such worldly, familiar types of pleasure as 'belonging' to the *uttama-puruṣa*, to the *pratibodhita* or 'enlightened' person, indicates—as far as my reading of the text is concerned—that in *turīya avasthā* a person lives simultaneously within the world, the phenomenal world, and out of it; after all, a certain amout of identification is needed in order to enjoy, even if 'merely mentally', what Śaṅkara refers to as '*stryādi*'. I will henceforth elaborate on this simultaneity, but first let us examine that last portion of Prajāpati's final instruction to Indra:

> Now, when this sight here gazes into spacem that
> is the seeing person, the faculty of sight
> enables one to see. The one who is aware: 'Let me
> small this'-that is the self; the faculty of
> smell enables to smell. The one who is aware :
> 'Let me say this'—that is the self; the faculty
> of speech enables him to speak. The one who is
> aware: 'Let me lisen to this'—that is the
> self; the faculty of hearing enables him to hear.
> The one who is aware: 'Let me think about this'—
> that is the self; the mind is his divine faculty
> of sight. This very self rejoices as it perceives
> with his mind, with that divine sight, these
> objects of desire found in the world of *Brahman*.[37]

This final portion of Prajāpati's final instruction further emphasizes the simultaneity of being both within and without, both involved and uninvolved ad the very core of *turīya avasthā*. Here we are told that the *ātman* does not see, smell, speak, listen and think, but rather that these activities 'belong' to the eyes-nose-mouth-ears-*manas*. The *ātman* is conscious of the occurrence of these activities on the *sthūla* or 'outer' level; he is conscious, he knows (the verb used by the *Upaniṣad-kāra* is '*veda*') rather than acts. In this respect, he is uninvolved. On the other hand he is involved, or merely in the sense of being ever-present, but we are also told that the will ('Let me smell this' etc.) is his and that the *indriyas* are somehow 'working for him; furthermore, we are told that he enjoys (*ramate*), perceiving through the mind objects-of-desire belonging to the *brahma-loka*. But we have already seen that he also enjoys worldly (*laukika*) pleasures such as 'women etc'. Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* acknowledges the simultaneity under discussion. Though emphasizing the fact that the *ātman* does not and in effect cannot act or be considered as a *kartā*, he admits that it does have some kind of 'ministerial responsibility' to that which takes place 'out there'; or as he puts it[38], the *ātman* is like the sun which is 'the agent of illumination by its mere presence' (*sattā-mātra eve prakāśana-kartṛtvam*), not by being actually engaged in the act. The *Upaniṣadic* picture of the *ātman* as the 'source of will' and as an enjoyer both in this world and in the *Brahman*-world, is hardly referred to by the Advaitin.

Conclusion : If we are to take the *Upaniṣadic* story seriously, then the picture of *suṣupti* and *turīya* depicted in it is very different from what we have become used to think of these two consciousness-states. *Suṣupti* is described by the *Upaniṣad-kāra* as 'one step too far', as a 'break' or discontinuity in one's consciousness. *Turīya* is depicted by him not merely *via negativa*, but rather positively, and surprisingly even in worldly terms. I have suggested that unlike the third state of consciounsess, in which the world has 'stopped'; in which there is no 'world' nor 'me', and which is seen by Indra as 'total destruction' (*vināśa*); in *turīya*, the world 'comes back', or rather the 'renouncer' returns to the world. Henceforth, he is a 'split personality', situated—as I have tried to illustrate—both 'within' and 'without'. 'The only people who see the whole picture', writes

Salman Rushdie in *The Ground Beneath Her Feet,* 'are the ones who step out of the frame'. A person in *turīya avasthā*—according to my reading—sits on the frame itself, one leg in and one leg out. Not merely his 'flesh eyes' are wide-open, but also his 'inner eye', his 'self-consciousness eye', his '*ayam aham asmīti eye*'; or rather, the novelty lies in the fact that not merely his 'inner eye' is open—as one might have expected—but also his 'flesh eyes', the eyes looking without. The fact that the 'inner eye' has been opened affects not the 'content' of the picture perceived by the 'flesh eyes', but rather the picture's status or value. Since the 'self-consciousness eye' has been unsealed, that which is perceived by the 'flesh eyes' is no longer considered as 'reality', but merely as 'a phenomenal perspective', perspective which might have its own pragmatic advantages (for example in directing a *śiṣya* toward his '*ātmanhood*', as in the case of Prajāpati and Indra). The realization that the 'outer picture' depends on the *indriyas* ('the faculty of smell enables him to smell' etc.), whereas I am not merely playing a role in the drama which appears in front of—and through my senses, but simultaneously watches it from the outside, brings about a special kind of 'lightness', even joy, as implied by *Upaniṣad-kāra*. Moreover, a person in *turīya avasthā* is free either to attend the 'phenomenal world' or to withdraw from it; either to participate, take part and hence identify at least to a certain extent with the so-called 'externlity', or to opt out, to withdraw his senses from their objects as a tortoise withdraws his limbs.

Śaṅkara's picture, as far as the story under discussion is concerned, is totally different. For him, the whole of the *Upaniṣadic* story is merely an illustration for the continuity of consciousness in all its states. For him, the identification with merely one of the consciousness-states is an error (*adhyāsa*), which causes suffering. According to Śaṅkara, consciousness prevails even in *suṣupti; turīya* has nothing to do with 'coming back to the world', since for him, there is nowhere to come back from or to. Consciousness has been here all along, and *turīya* is merely the recognition of its everlasting, eternal continuity and unity. *Turīya,* as seen by Śaṅkara, in effect consists of all the other states of consciousness toghther, or as K.C. Bhattacharyya accurately puts it, 'it is not only a stage among stages (of consciousness); it is the truth of the other states'.[39]

Note :

1. In referring to the fourth state of consciousness (*turīya*) as 'transcendental consciousness', I am drawing on Eliot Deutsch (1969, p. 63).
2. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.12.3.
3. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.11.1-2.
4. Ya ātmā apahata-pāpmā vijaro vimṛtyur viśoko vijighatso' pipāsaḥ satya-kāmaḥ satya-saṃkalpaḥ (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.7.1, Olivelle [1998], p. 278-279).
5. It is Śaṅkara who refuses to read the story literally and to acknowledge the possibility that a *guru* might mislead his disciples, even within the context of a gradual didactic proces, merely to allow them to—how shall I put it—write 'the bottom line' of the teaching with their own pen. Absorbed as he is in truth—believes the Advaitin—a *guru* simply cannot mislead his disciples; hence, according to his reading, Prajāpati's first instruction is radically misunderstood by Indra and Virocana. See Śaṅkara's *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 8.7.4 (Gambhīrānanda, [1992], p. 622-623). According to him, even in his second and third instructions, Prajāpati is misunderstood by Indra; I will further elaborate on Śaṅkara's reading in the lines to come.
6. ya eṣo 'kṣiṇi puruṣo dṛśyata eṣa ātmeti (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.7.4, Olivelle [1998], p. 280-281).
7. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.8.4.
8. ya eṣa svapne mahīyamānaś carati eṣa ātmā (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.10.1, Olivelle [1998], p. 282-283.
9. tad yatraitat suptaḥ samastaḥ samprasannaḥ svapnaṃ na vijānāti eṣa ātmeti (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.11.1, Olivelle [1998], p. 284-285).
10. Apte (2005), p. 586.
11. Radhakrishnan (2005), p. 507.
12. yatra supto na kañcana kāmaṃ kāmayate ne kañcana svapnaṃ paśyati tat suṣuptam (*Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad* 5, Olivelle [1998], p. 474-475).
13. Dave (1990), p. 28.
14. Ibid.
15. *Yogasūtra* 1.2.
16. *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* 1.10.
17. Ibid.
18. Deutsch, E. (1969), p. 61.
19. Bhattacharyya (1983), p. 26-27.
20. nāha khalv ayam evam sampraty ātmānaṃ jānāty ayam aham asmīti I no evemāni bhūtāni I vināśam evāpīto bhavati I nāham atra bhogyaṃ paśyāmīti (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.11.1; Olivelle [1998], p. 284-285.

21. Radhakrishnan (2005), p. 507.
22. *Upadeśasāhasrī* 2.50 (prose) : gurur uvāca—tvaṃ pramātmānaṃ santam asaṃsāriṇaṃ samsāry aham asmīti viparītaṃ pratipadyase' kartāraṃ santam karteti abhoktāram santam bhokteti *vidyamānaṃ cāvidyamānam itīyam* avidyā (Narasimhan [1996], p. 325).
23. In using this phrase, I am drawing on Anantanand Rambachan (1991).
24. I am aware of the fact that '*tat tvam asi*' is a '*Brahman-centered*' utterance (the particle '*tat*' referring to the *Brahman* even grammatically); whereas '*ayam aham asmīti*' is an '*ātman*-centered' statement. Nevertheless, taking into account the famous *ātman-Brahman*' indentity, I believe that both statements can be understood as conveying the *advaitic* realization. In fact, both Indra in the eighth chapter of the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* and Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* to the sixth chapter of the same *Upaniṣad* (the '*tat tvam asi* chapter') are concerned with the *ātman*, not the *Brahman*.
25. jñāne hi sati jñātuḥ sad-bhāvo 'vagamyate nāsati jñāne । na ca suṣuptasya jñānam dṛṣyate 'to vinaṣṭa ivety abhiprāyah (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.11.1; Gambhīrānanda [1992], p. 643).
26. Bhattacharyya (1983), p. 26-27.
27. nāntaḥ-prajñaṃ na bahiḥ-prajñaṃ nobhayataḥ-prajñaṃ na prajñanaghanaṃ na prajñaṃ nāprajñam । adṛṣṭam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekātma-pratyaya-sāraṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śāntaṃ śivam advaitaṃ caturthaṃ manyante (*Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad* 7; Olivelle [1998], p. 474).
28. Deutsch (1969) p. 63.
29. K.C. Bhattacharyya (1983, p. 27) agrees that there is some similarity between *suṣupti* and *savitarka-samādhi*, in the sense that in both cases 'the timeless seeds of knowledge and action persist', the outcome of which is that both states are remembered as a part episode upon awakening from them. Nevertheless, he further emphasizes the difference between the two states : Accodring to him, in *suṣupti*, the 'empirical mind' lapses altogether; whereas in *savitarka-samādhi*, it does not lapse but rather 'gets concentrated into one absolute irrelative mode which thus becomes actualized in the highest degree' (i.e. in *nirvikalpa-samādhi*). Furthermore, he explains that upon waking up from *suṣupti*, the self remembers that it was in a 'knowing of objects more; even though the object was a blank; whereas upon awakening from *savitarka-samādhi*, the self remembers that it was not at all in the usual 'knowing of objects mode' but rather the very object of that state.
30. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.12.1-6.

31. tad yathaitāny amuṣmād ākāśāt samutthāya paraṃ jyotir upasampadya svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyante I evam evaiṣa samprasādo ’smāc charīrāt samutthāya paraṃ jyotir upasampadya svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.12.2-3; Olivelle [1998], p. 284-285).
32. sa tatra paryeti jakṣat krīḍan ramamāṇah strībhir vā yānair vā jñātibhir vā nopajanaṃ smarann idaṃ śarīram (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.12.3; Ibid).
33. iti vairāgyārthaṃ viśeṣa ityucyate āttam mṛtyuneti I kathaṃ nāma dehābhimānato viraktaḥ sannivartata iti I śarīramityatra sahendriyamanobhirucyate (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 8.12.1; Gambhīrānanda [1992], p. 646).
34. Radhakrishnan (2005), p. 509.
35. nāsi tvaṃ dehendnyādidharmā, tattvam asīti (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 8.12.3 Gambhīrānanda [1992], p. 658).
36. Ibid, p. 659.
37. atha yatraitad ākāśam anu viṣaṇṇam cakṣuh sa cākṣuṣah puruṣah darśanāya cakṣuḥ I atha yo veda idaṃ jighrāṇīti sa ātmā gandhāya ghrāṇam I atha yo veda idam abhivyāharāṇīti sa ātmā abhivyāhārāya vāk I atha yo veda idam śṛṇavānīti sa ātmā śravaṇāya śrotram II atha yo veda idam manvānīti sa ātmā I mano’ sya daivaṃ cakṣuḥ I sa vā eṣa etena daivena cakṣuṣā manasaitān kāmān paśyan ramate ye ete brahmaloke II (*Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* 8.12.4-5; Olivelle [1998], p. 284-287).
38. *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* 8.12.5 (Gambhīrānanda [1992], p. 664).
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RĀMĀNUJA'S VEDĀNTA AND PANENTHEISM OF HARTSHORNE

K.R. Sundararajan

This paper will explore the compatibility of the concept of panentheism as developed by Charless Hartshorne, a leading Philosopher of Religion of the 20th century, with the Vedānta philosophy developed by Rāmānuja, an important Hindu philosopher/ theologian of the 12th century. The goal of this endeavor is to see Rāmānuja as a panentheist in the lines of Charles Hartshorne. Hartshorne himself opens up the possibility of such a study, by introducing Rāmānuja along with Śaṅkara and Aśvagoṣa as representatives of classical pantheism in his book, *Philosophers Speak of God*[1]. However, for Hartshorne, though Rāmānuja's Vedānta had the potential ingredients for developing into a "throughgoing and consistent panentheism[2] it did not do so, as it failed to solve the issue of being and becoming along the lines of panentheism. In this connection, Hartshorne says that the implications of body-self relationship, which is central to Rāmānuja's theology, has not been fully worked out by Rāmānuja. I will focus on the criticism of Hartshorne with regard to the Vedānta of Rāmānuja at the end of the paper, and claim that Harshorne fails to do justice to the theological formulations of Rāmānuja, and the implication they have on the questions of "One and Many".

Let me first beging with the definition of Panentheism in Rune's Dictionary of Philosophy.

> (Panentheism is)...the view that God interpenetrates everything without canceling the relative, independent existence of the world of entities; moreover, while God is immanent, this immanence is not absolute (as in pantheism); God is more than the world, transcendent, in the sense that though the created is dependent on the Creator, the Creator is not dependent on the created. God is thus held to be the highest type of Unity, viz. a Unity in Multiplicity. This term is employed to cover a mediating position between pantheism with its extreme immanence and a theism of the type which tends to extreme transcendence.[3]

Hartshorne in his Introduction to *Philosophers Speak of God* describes the standpoint of panentheism as "dipolar" instead of "monoploar", which described classical theism and classical pantheism, as they streas only one dimension of the human experience of the divine, the eternal in contrast to the temporal, the absolute in contrast to the relative.

> The method here is this : taking each pair of ultimate contraries, such as one and many, permanence and change, being and becoming, necessity and contingency, the self-sufficient or nonrelative versus dependent or relative, the actual versus the potential, one decides in each case which member of the pair is good or admirable and then attributes it (in some supremely excellent or transcendent form) to deity, while wholly denying the contrasting term.[4]

This is the situation in both classical theism and classical pantheism. In classical theism, while plurality, potentiality. and becoming are admitted, each is considered "as a secondary form of existence "outside" God, in no way constitutive of his reality.."[5] In classical pantheism, Hartshorne points out that "although God includes all within himself, since he cannot be really complex, or mutable, such categories can only express human ignorance or illusion."[6] "One pole of each category is regarded as more excellent than the other, so that the supremely excellent being cannot be described by the other or inferior pole."[7]

The dipolar understanding is based on "the Law of Polarity", according to which, "ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be described by the wholly one-sided assertion of simplicity, being, actuality, and the like, each in a "pure" form devoid and independent of complexity, becoming, potentiality, and related contraries."[8] However, the dipolar view avoids the contradiction that emerges out of attributing two opposite attributes to the same person (God) by positing "two main aspects in the essence of the supreme being", to which each one of the categories apply.[9] Hartshorne cautions that "What we must negate of both aspects is any nonsupreme form of either pole, any mediocre or merely ordinary unity or complexity, activity or passivity, self-sufficiency or dependence. True, these mediocre forms will also be contained in the supreme reality, which by virtue of its supreme complexity will include all things; but it will not include them in its essence, in either of the two aspects spoken of, but rather in its accidents.''[10] ''To have accidents....will be a requirement of the essence, by virtue of the pole of contingency, relativity, and passivity; but particular accidents which God has will strictly be outside his essence. ''Essence'' here means the individual in abstration from all in him that is accidental, or without which he would still be 'himself''.[11]

The interrelated and interdependent understading of contraries that characterizes panentheistic understanding of the nature of God has important implications. Becoming is not inferior to being, but is an ''essential'' aspect of Being. According to Hartshorne, ''Becoming... is something positive and ultimate.''[12] ''...whereas other beings are accidental products of becoming, we should think of God as qualifying becoming essentially....''[13] Thus, ''God is a being whose versatility of becoming is unlimited, whose potentialities of content embrace all possibilites, whose sensitive responses surpasses all other invididuals, actual or possible,''[14] Raising a question as to what is meant by ''God'', Hartshorne writes :

> Up to a certain point we answer this question in agreement with the monopolarists. God is name for the uniquely good, admirable, great, worship-eliciting being...God is ''perfect'', and between the perfect and anything as little imperfect as you please is no merely finite, but an infinite, step. The superiority of the deity to all others cannot...be expressed by indefinite descriptions, such as ''immensely good,'' ''very powerful'', or even ''best'' or ''most powerful'', but must be a superiority in principle, a definite conceptual divergence from every other being, actual or so much possible. We may call this divergence ''categorical supremacy.''[15]

Thus the divine superiority is a ''matter of priciple, not merely of degree.''[16] ''He is good-period. He is wise-period. He is powerful-period. Thus God alone is strictly or simply holy, omniscient, omnipotent; this means that he is alone without arbitrary or peculiar limitation upon his righteousness, wisdom, or power....''[17] Thus having established divine supremacy, Harshorne hastens to add, that God's perfection and excellence do not negate the possibility of God excelling himself in another state. ''Through such self-excelling the most excelling being changes, not into a more excellent being, but into a more excellent state of the same being....He has not changed from "himself" into another person, another individual, any more than I do when I engage in a new conversation, perhaps with an old friend."[18]

Putting together all the essential components of a panentheistic view of God, Hartshorne point out that in includes the following five aspects:

E Eternal—in some aspects of his reality devoid of change, whether as birth, death, increase, or decrease.

T Temporal—in some aspects capable of change, at least in the form of increase of some kind.

C Conscious, self-aware

K Knowing the world, omniscient

W World-inclusive, having all things as constituents.[19]

By placing Rāmānuja under the category of classical pantheism along with Śaṅkara, Spinoza, and Royce, for Hartshorne, Rāmānuja's theology is void of the temporal, while including all other components from the above, namely ECKW. It is interesting to see what Harshorne writes in his introductory comments on Rāmānuja under the chapter on Classical Pantheism :

> The reality of the creatures is as sharply affirmed by this thinker as by his European counterparts. Change and diversity are ultimate facts, God has definite dealings with the world; he permits acts of human will; he rules over all things, God in his spiritual actuality as Soul or Highest Lord of the world is immutable.[20]

According to Hartshorne, this is the theistic dimension of Rāmānuja. The pantheistic dimension of Rāmānuja consists in the fact that "the whole of created changing reality is within total divinity as consisting of cosmic soul with its all inclusive body."[21] For Hartshorne, there are two great issues in the theology of Rāmānuja : (1) the Highest Lord is conceived in a monopolar fashion as immutable, incapable of acquisition or suffering, etc., and (2) the world is real and mutable and derivative from the Highest Lord.[22] Hartshorne's complaint about Rāmānuja appears to be that he fails to resolve this issue on the lines of panentheism. In Hartshorn's view, Rāmānuja's solution was still on the lines of monopolarity rather than dipolarity.[23] Harshorne comments:

> ...the grand issue of monopolarity versus dipolarity is scarcely covered at all in the main philosophical tradition of India. But, thanks in no small part to Rāmānuja, a healthy instability does obtain and now and then results in approaches to dipolarism or panentheism, as in Śrī Jīva in more recent times. Rāmānuja thus had apparently something like the role of William James in our culture. With immense courage and penetration, he attacked doctrines often supposed to be almost invulnerable and at least weakened the force of the pretensions with which they were hedged about.[24]
>
> Perhaps the failure of Rāmānuja to establish his position against Śaṅkara, save in the eyes of a minority of Hindu thinkers, even to this day (as it appears) is due to his not having achieved a thoroughgoing and consistent panentheism. He is apparently the closest to such a doctrine that ancient India got, as Plato is the closest the ancient Western world got; but neither got close enough to make panentheism a live issue at any time in the next thousand years or more.[25]

Against Hartrshorne's complaint on the failure of Rāmānuja, I wish to argue that if Rāmānuja's body-self relationship (*śarīra-śarīrī*) is fully understood, he could be seen quite close to the panentheist point of view.

For Rāmānuja, the scriptural sources establish clearly three eternal principles (*tattvas*), which are *Brahman*, the Supreme Reality, *ātman*, the individual self, and *prakṛti*, primordial matter. The relationship between these three principles are stated to be as follows : *Brahman* as the Self with *ātman* and *prakṛti* as its body (*śarīrī-śarīra*); *Brahman* as the controller with *ātman* and *prakṛti* as the "controlled" (*niyantā-niyamya*); and *Brahman* as the owner with *ātman* and *prakṛti* as the "owned" (*śeṣa-śeṣī*). Thus, *ātman* and *prakṛti* are totally dependent on *Brahman*. On these three forms of relationship, the body-self relationship (*śarīra-śarīrī*) is central to the theology of Rāmānuja. This relationship is taken in a literal sense. This is the way Rāmānuja resolves the central issue of Vedānta, namely One and Many. Unlike Śaṅkara, the "many" is not ultimately illusory (*māyā*), but many-ness is the "real" transformation of the two eternal principles, namely the self and primordial matter. Thus, creation is real, and it is through creation that the diverse and multiple phenomena come into existence. Rāmānuja's theory of causation, called *satkāryavāda*, affirms that the "effect" is the "real" transformation of the cause, in contrast to *vivartavāda* advanced by Śaṅkara, wherein the transformation into effect is only "apparent" and not "real".[26] Hence, as Hartshorne himself points out, for Rāmānuja the temporal world (T) is real and it is an "aspect" of *Brahman* as its body (*śarīra*).

Besides acknowledging the reality of the temporal, does Ramanuja's body-self relationship involve a situation of mutual interaction between these two? Such interactions, if any, would certainly make Rāmānuja's theology panentheistic. It is true that Rāmānuja is eager to maintain the "independence" of *Brahman* from *ātman* and *prakṛti*, in the context of "total dependency" of *ātman* and *prakṛti* on *Brahman*. Even in his understanding of *Brahman* as the "efficient" and "material" cause of creation, Rāmānuja stresses that *Brahman* as the Self is not subject to change. *Brahman* himself does not become the temporal world, but only its body does. From the fact that it is by the will of *Brahman* that creation takes place, and it is by the freedom granted by *Brahman* as the Self (*anumati*, permission) that the individual self is able to initiate and engage in actions of various sorts, the self appears to "influences" its body, whereas instances of body "influencing" the Self are not so apparent. However, I want to claim that in Rāmānuja's theology, the immutability of *Brahman* does not mean that God is indifferent to human situation of *saṃsāra*, for otherwise the various forms of divine manifestations (*avatāras*), which are an important part of his theology, would have no relevance and significance.

In the very instance it should be noted that Rāmānuja's *Brahman* is personal, and not impersonal as in the non-dual Vedānta of Śaṅkara. He equates *Brahman* with *Viṣṇu*, and *Viṣṇu* has a divine foom not dissimilar to humans; though it is non-material in kind and supersensible. It can only be seen by direct mystical experience. In his *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, Rāmānuja points out that "His form does not fall within the range of perception. No one sees him with his eyes".[27] However, the very notion of "divine person" similar to the "human person" is important to us in our search for panentheistic aspects in the theology of Rāmānuja. This seems to be an appropriate form of divinity, where the divinity could be *responsive* to the existential situation of the human person and be perhaps *affected* by the *sāṃsāric* conditions in which humans find themselves as the result of their own actions. This is not an unreasonable statement, considering the fact that in the thology of Rāmānuja, *Viṣṇu* plays two important roles, as *creator* and as *savior*. Creation is the consequence of *līlā*, divine play, and this is MEANT to stress God's perfection and completeness, as creation flows from divine spontaneity, and not out of necessity. There is nothing that God achieves by creation, as play is not goal oriented action, thus *līlā* is "purposeless purpose". However, it is the same God who becomes the savior in the context of human beings who are trapped in *saṃsāra*, the cycle of reincarnation, governed by the law of *karma*. These two sides to Rāmānuja's theology are reflected in his theory of creation : first, the affirmation of the supremacy and transcendence (*paratva*) of *Brahman* and second, the theme of closeness or accessibility (*saulabhya*). These follow also from the two categories of qualities (*guṇas*) attributed to *Viṣṇu*: (1) essential qualities, and (2) auspicious qualities. Five qualities are stated to be the defining qualities (*svarūpa*) of *Brahman*. These are *satya, jñāna, ananta, ānandamaya,* and *amala,* meaning true being, knowledge, infinitude, bliss, and stainlessness or purity respectively. These are the defining qualities of divine transcendence (*paratva*). The auspicious (*kalyāṇa*) qualities are said to be innumerable. Among these qualities, Rāmānuja mentions the following : *aiśvarya, gāmbhīrya, audārya, and kāruṇya,* Lordship, grandeur, generosity, and kindness or mercy. These two categories of qualities together describe the nature of *Brahman*. Rāmānuja's description of *Brahman* in *Śrī Bhāṣya* combines these two categories of qualities. For instance, he writes in IV.4.22 :

> We know from the scripture that there is a Supreme Person whose nature is absolute bliss and goodness; who is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil; who is the cause of origination, sustentation, and dissolution of the world; who differs in nature from all other beings, who is all-knowing, who by his mere thought and will accomplishes all his purposes; who is a ocean of kindness as it were for all who depend on him; who is all-merciful; who is immeasurably raised above all possibility of any one being equal or superior to him; whose name is the highest *Brahman*.[28]

In his *Divine Relativity*, Hartshorne equates panentheism with "surrelativism" and in explaining this concept, he writes:

> God orders the universe, according to panentheism, by taking into his own life all the currents of feeling in his existence. He is the most irresistible of all-influences precisely because he is himself most open to influences. In the depth of their hearts all creatures defer to God, because they sense him as the one who alone is adequately moved by what moves him...In this (concept we have) vision of a deity who is not a supreme autocrat, but a universal agent of "persuasion" whose "power is the worship he inspires" that is, flows from the intrinsic appeal to his infinitely sensitive and tolerant relativity....

I would like to suggest that Rāmānuja's *Viṣṇu* with the attributes of grace and mercy (*kṛpā and dayā*) would fit well with Harshorne's notion of God being "open to influence". This aspect of divine accessibility becomes the central feature of one of the schools of Vaiṣṇavism (*Śrī Vaiṣṇavism*) in the post-Rāmānuja period. There are certain limitations, however, to Rāmānuja being considered a *fully* panentheist on the lines of Hartshorne. For Hartshorne, the bipolar view must not only hold that God contains suffering but that he suffers, and it is in his character to suffer, in accordance with the suffering of the world.[29] This is an issue on which Rāmānuja is not likely to agree, especially in the context of his disputes with the *Bhedābheda* school of Vedānta, which seems to suggest such a possibility. I am not sure we could push the concepts of divine grace and mercy in Rāmānuja's theology to include the notion of "suffering God". He seems to remain equally committed to the Indian notion that *Brahman* is far beyond change. It is the body (*śarīra*) that changes, but not the self (*sarīrin*). However, it is interesting to see that some of the human incarnations of *Viṣṇu* are stated to possess human emotions and to display some of the human "disabilities", and these features are central to the popular Vaiṣṇava piety. Again the notion of "self-excelling Godhead" of Hartshorne[30] is not stated in the theological writing of Rāmānuja.

In spite of these reservations, I would like to conclude that Rāmānuja could be labeled a "panentheist", since both divine transcendence and divine accessibility are equaly important in his theology. They seem to support a notion of divine being who is essentially different from the created world of finitude and limitations, but still by His disposition (*svabhāva*), interacts actively with the created world by providing sustenace and support in the process of human redemption.

References :

1. (2000 reprint), New York : Humanity Books.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
3. cited in John C. Plott, "Rāmānuja as Panentheist", *Journal of Annamalai University* (XVII), (1953).
4. pp. 1-2.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. "...there is no law of logic against attributing contrasting predicates to the same individual provided they apply to diverse aspects of this individual". pp. 14-15.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
19. *Ibid.* p. 16.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
26. V.A. Sukhtankar, while contrasting the causal theories of Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara, suggests that Śaṅkara's theory could be described as *satkāraṇavāvada* in contrast to Rāmānuja's *satkāryavada.* For Rāmānuja, while the effect (*kārya*) is real, for Śaṅkara only the cause (*kāraṇa*) is real, and effect is not real but illusory, *māyā, (The Teachings on Vedanta According to Ramanuja.* (1908) Wien : Druck Von Adolf Holzhausen). p. 23.
27. Verse 252.
28. Thibaut, p. 770.
29. *Philosophers Speak of God,* p. 15.
30. *ibid.*, p. 10.

'THE SPEAKER-I' SEMANTICS

Kalyan Kumar Bagchi

It may not be too audacious a claim to make, admitting that great movements of thought *have* taken place in philosophy in the late nineteenth century and in the twentieth century, that K.C. Bhattacharyya's many reflections on 'Knowledge', 'Truth', 'Error', 'Negation', 'Alternation', 'Value', 'Rasa', 'Freedom', *et al* give new *directions* to philosophical enterprise and propose new *idioms of* thought and language, which compel us to review and come out of our accepted grooves of throught. 'His analytical rigour', wrote the late Professor D.M. Datta, 'would remind one of Moore'. But, what is strikingly novel about Bhattacharyya is the profundity of his analytic exercises horizontally opening up hitherto unchartered boundaries of thought within which problems, appearing to be intractable, can be solved or within which problems can be *re-located, re-defined.* and *re-fined.*

Indeed, Bhattacharyya is overwhelming in these respects; and, I, for one, am painfully aware of my limitations when I discuss his thought.

I want to deal with Bhattacharyya's notion of *the* subject. Reading Bhattacharyya in this matter, one feels : gone are all speculations of Dogmatic Metaphysics of the soul, gone particularly are the facile Indian reference to *Brahman, Ātman,* Vedānta—to which one takes recourse in one's asylum of ignorance and mental indolence. No, stop all talk of *Ātman,* of the *Upaniṣad* as '*Brahmajñānavanaspati*' and so on and on. Max Müller gave the Hindus their souls back. But apart from the classical commentaries or works on Post-Śaṅkara Dialectics, has our *cultured cognoscenti* ever throught of *Ātman* or *Brahman* (or whatever that Müller gave us) with all the seriousness it deserves? If you have to talk of *the Subject,* do it by a serious *in-depth* probing into the semantics of the *discourse* needed in the matter. This is what I propose to do following Bhattacharyya's analytical rigour, backed up by the profundity of his insight.

Discourse on what in philosophical parlance has been called, 'self' or 'subject' of consciousness, has always been bedevilled by problems either of the supposed *entity* or the *designatum* of the expression *or* of the semantics of the discourse itself. Despite their fundamental philosophical differences, philosopheres of a Plato-like and a Hume-like turn of mind concerned themselves with the search for the *thing*, the *object*, the *entity*—call it as you will—that is, supposedly, the content of the concept of 'Self' or 'Subject' or 'Spiritual Substance' or whatever; only, a Plato would return an affirmative answer and a Hume a negative answer to the question : '*Is* there anything which is called self or subject?' But it remains a fact that both of them *looked for* the *entity* called 'self' or 'subject'. We waive the question whether Self or Subject was conceived by the philosophers concerned as the *referent* of the work 'self'; or, again, the question whether the entity they looked for could be the *content* of the concept of the self. We are not, i.e., committing ourselves to any thesis of *realism of words* in the Platonic way, nor are we siding with Hume's anti-realism in this context, deriving its strength form empiricism. It is not again our interest to take a Davidson-like stance that people agree on the meaning of sentences containing the word [self], and that this agreement is derived from the sentences being *true.*

We begin in a straightforward manner with the question—'When philosophers talk of self or subject, is there anything in common parlance that may make clear to one such talk of self or subject?'

Hopefuly, there *is*. That is, there is an expression in common parlance which answers to the philosophically loaded concept of self or subject. Common parlance *can* translate the concept in its own idiom. In its idiom, self or subject is the person who says 'I'.

It will be immediately countered that nobody says 'I'. What one says is *e.g.,* 'I am a teacher', 'I am a pupil' etc. One, i.e., says *that* one is so and so. One says something *about* oneself. One says something about oneself under a description. *Minus* such description, 'I' is just contentless. Only a Descartes found room for the statement 'I am' in his system. But, as Ayer said, 'I am' is a 'degenerate proposition' in which 'am' is a 'sleeping partner'. And it may further be said that 'I' is just a personal pronoun, which can be used only as a particle of statements that one makes about oneself. Such statements may be first person statements or first-person psychological statements; but whichever the case, the point remains that only in the matrix of *statements* can the personal pronoun 'I' be used. So reverting to 'I am', it has to be admitted that 'I am' does not *say* anything *more than* this—"the word 'I' and the word 'am' can be interchanged'', and this not only does not say anything, but also is not a tautology; for a tautology at least performs the semantically important task of interchanging synonymous expresions, whereas 'I am' would be, semantically, an oddity if it were taken to be the interchange of 'I' and 'am', 'what, after all—one wonders—is 'I' apart from 'am', or *vice versa*?

But—and this is a big 'but'—granted all that has been said hereterfore, two facts stare us in the face : (i) the Upaniṣadic philosopher says '*aham asmi*'; and (ii) you are looking for me and I say—pointing to my body* of course—'this is I'. Both the philosopher, reflective as he is, and I, mired in mundaneity as I am, join hands here; both want to convey this to their respective hearers thet '*aham*' or 'I' is user-specific. Both want to make a point, both want to *say something*. What is that? It is this that 'I am', though not informative in any way, yet symbolises the speaker for his hearer, In the diction Professor K.C. Bhattacharyya has familiarised us with, 'I am' is no 'literal' language, it is the 'self-symbolising' of the speaker of 'I'.

Now, this concept of self-symbolising may be sought to be watered down in *three ways.* : *First*, this concept of self-symbolising may be taken to be a periphrasis of, what may be called, speaker-specificity of the word 'I': and then on, it may be argued, *every* or *any* speaker who utters the word 'I' takes it to be specific to himself. And, if this is granted, then it has also to be granted that one individual speaker uses the word in its general meaning which is *any speaker*. Therefore, it would be pointed out, the use of the word by a speaker with reference to himself is no different from his use of *any other word* with a meaning, which his hearer too would use with the same meaning. That is to say : the speaker uses the word 'I' with reference to himself and his hearer too uses the word 'I' with reference to himself—both with a general meaning. The upshot of this entire discussion is this: the speaker, like his hearer, is *meant* by the word 'I', is a *denotation* of 'I'.

Secondly, the user-specificity of 'I' may be taken to be, what Russell called long ago, the 'ego-centricity' of 'I'. Says Russell, '''I' belongs to the biography of the speaker''. So 'I' is an 'indexical word" which, so to say, lies ready at hand for any speaker to pick up to inscribe his biography. The doctrine of the user-specificity of 'I' does not confer any privelege upon a speker to write *only his biograhpy*; his hearer, who may take up the role of speaker, may as well write *his* biography with the word.

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* The Strawsonian point about identification will be taken up for consideration later on.

Thirdly, does not the emphasis on user-specificity amount to *individual* speaker-specificity? And is not this latter another name for Solipsism?

With regard to the *first objection,* Professor Bhattacharyya's comments would be as follows :

1. The word 'I' has of course a meaning. It means any speaker. But, no two persons would use the word 'I' of the same thing...[1] The speaker and the hearer 'must be agreed about a meaning'[2] Yet, if a person understands me when I use the word 'I' with reference to myself, he understands me not through the meaning of the word, but 'through the word'. That is to say, my hearer understands me to *be, as though,* the 'I', as *though the word.* And this is just to admit that the word turns into *a self-symbolising word* in the context of its use by a speaker. And here, by introducing the notion of the word 'I' as a self-symbolising word, Bhattacharyya paves the way to a larger construction : only through this word is the Subject or the Self— apparently very private, if not ghostly—is understood, or the objective discipline of epistemology can be founded. The Self or the Subject is either understood as self-symbolised, or not understood at all.

What about the point that Bhattachrayya himself makes, viz., that the speaker and the hearer 'must be agreed' about the meaning of 'I'? Is this point a concession on his part that the speaker and the hearer understand each other—when each use 'I' through the *meaning* of the word? No. Involved in their agreed understanding is this point that each is a possible 'I', or that each *may* be a speaker of 'I'. But this agreement between the speaker and the hearer with regard to the understanding of the *meaning* of 'I' has nothing to do with their understanding of each other when each of them uses the word. Each of them, as using the word 'I' is understood by the other not as *meant* by the word, but as *the* word, as the 'I', not as *a* speaker *of* 'I' but as *'the* speaker I'. At the root of epistemology is '*the* speaker I', '*the* speaker symbolising itslef in *I*', *the* Subject, *the* Self.

One either speaks of *the* Subject as symbolised in 'I' i.e., as 'the speaker I' or does not speak of it at all.

With regard to the *second point*, Bhattacharyya's position would be that the 'I' belongs not to the 'biography' of the speaker but to his *autobiography*. The immediate rejoinder may be that this is just a trifle—it is a mere play with words. Well, then, let us follow Russell and christen 'I' as an 'indexical' word (like other indexical words in our lexicon, eg. 'here' 'there' 'now', 'this' etc.). But then, an indexical word is, after all, an interpreted symbol. Its interpretation is derived from our semantics or semantic conventions. If, now, 'I' is understood as an interpreted symbol within our semantic field, then it has to be maintained that a speaker who uses it *culls* it from the semantic field. But there is *no* semantic field outside the speaker, who is distinctively the 'speaker I', from which the speaker may be said to cull the word. The 'I' as used *recoils* on the speaker, it is—as used, again—but the 'speaker I'. The 'speaker I' *constitutes the only* field for the 'I'.

To buttress the point, we may continue discussing it in a slightly different idiomatic garb. To that end, we pose the question to ourselves—viz., 'Does 'I' have a public or general meaning? Or does it not? Or, is it a singular term?' The answer would be that it has indeed a general meaning which is 'any speaker'. But then, as Professor Bhattacharyya points out, "...different speakers can be understood to use it—each of a distinct thing, viz., himself...As used, the term has a uniquely singular reference; but as understood, it is general in the sense the term 'unique' is general".[3] Just as corresponding to the general word 'unique' there is nothing 'unique' as a generality, even so corresponding to the general word 'I', there is no 'I' as a generality in as much as different speakers are of course *understood* to use it, but each is understood to use it with reference to himself. Bhattacharyya thus takes the wind out of the sails of those who maintain (as the Naiyāyikas do) that the subject or the self is 'meant', i.e., *padārtha* in the Naiyāyka's diction or who may maintain that the subject or the sale is a denotatum of 'I'.

It may still be insisted that the word 'I', like 'now', 'this', 'that', 'here', is a demonstrative symbol. A demonstrative symbol is, of course, speaker-centric, and to this extent, but to this extent only, can Professor Bhattacyaryya's contention with regard to the speaker-specificity of 'I' be granted. *But*, the opponent (*purvapakṣa*) of Bhattacharyya would add, demonstrative sysmbols are, after all, public words. This is a point which was made by Strawson. As he says, "...we shall not give up the platitude that 'here' and 'now' and 'this' and 'I' are words of our common language which each can use to indicate, or help to indicate, to another, who is with him, what he is talking about."[4]

To do justice to Strawson, the foregoing observation of his should be taken up within his larger concern; which is that of situating our talk of things and persons and events and periods of history within, what he calls, his ontology of objective particulars.[5] Strawson is aware that, to the end of founding such ontology that would provide a common or public framework of our talk, he was to reckon with philosophers who, very well aware that *here-and-now* provides a point of reference, yet suppose that "'here' and 'now' and 'this' and all such utterance-centred words refer to something private and personal to each individual user of them."[6] Against philosophers of such a turn of mind, Strawson writes "Such philosophers deprive themselves of a public point of reference by making the point of reference private."[7]

For bringing Bhattacharyya's point of view into bold relief, we shall split up the foregoing observations into (i) Strawson's contentions and (ii) contentions of one whom we may call a Demonsrtativist with regard to the use of 'I'.

With regard to Strawson, it may be said that his contention that 'I', (like 'here', 'now', 'this'), is a word of common language which one can use to indicate to another who is with him, has been taken care of by Bhattachayya when he says that, 'different persons may be understood to use the word', but *with the proviso* that each uses it with reference to himself. 'I', of course, is a word of what Strawson calls 'common language'. But this does not give Strawson or any philosopher the warrant to conclude that *therefore*, there is *necessarily* a common point of reference. There is, indeed, such commonality, better *coalescence of reference*, when the speaker and the hearer use the same word with reference to the *self-same content*. Let us hear Bhattacharyya on this point. Says he "A meaning that is conveyed by a word must be intelligible to the hearer as what he would himself convey by the word....A general term is always understood by the speaker and the hearer to mean the same thing.''[8] The situation or the context differs when the use of 'I' is concerned. As Bhattacharyya says, ''The word *I* as used by a speaker is not understood by the hearer to convey what he would himself convey by the use of it. It he used the word, he would intend himself...''[9] Not the speaker (who might have used the word before he used it), surely; and yet, the speaker can and does 'indicate', in Strawson's diction, 'to another who is with him'. How? And here, Bhattacharyya is indeed strikingly novel. Once again, let us hear him : ''If he (hearer) used the word, he would intend himself and 'not the speaker''. Proceeding further, Bhattacharyya writes that the hearer understands the word 'I' to 'stand for the speaker'; he understands the speaker ''through the word but not through the meaing of the word.''[10] The speaker can 'indicate' to another who is with him through the word 'I'. The speaker is *the* 'I'. The word is *verily the* object here. To revert to the Strawsonian idiom of discourse in the present context, admission of 'common language' *does not*—in the context in which 'I' is used—give the *warrant* to one to go on to admit *'common point of reference'*. On the contrary, common language in—the word 'I' as though lying there for any speaker to pick up, may yet leave room for *multiplicity* of reference points, i.e., as many reference points as there are speakers. What is the harm if such multiple reference points are admitted? Any apprehension that such admission would spell the doom to all our discourse? Well, such apprehension would be groundless. Understanding between the speaker and the hearer, between the speaker's 'I' and the hearer's *'I', presupposes as little a common point of reference* as does it presuppose a common general 'I'. It is not as communicating persons that we become speakers *and* hearers to one another; rather, communication takes place between *a* 'speaker I' recognising *another* 'speaker I' without, in such recognition, *engulfing* 'another speaker I' in any general 'speaker-I'. For Bhattacharyya's theory of communication, 'the speaker I' is the primary unit.

So the long and short of the discussion on Strawson is that the Strawsonian point about *'indication'* of a speaker to 'another' is taken care of by Bhattacharyya by preserving the *public sense of 'I'*, which is 'any speaker', but without presupposing the *public use* of 'I'.

We now turn to the philosopher who maintains that 'I' can be demonstratively used. The point of this contention is that '*the* subject' or '*the* speaker I' of Bhattacharyya's conception can be *pointed at* by the speaker itself, as it can point at any thing as 'this' or 'that'. Do we not say 'Here am I'? To the question asked of members of a group, viz., 'Who was witness to the gruesome incident?' one may return the answer 'It was I'. To the teacher's calling a certain roll number in a class, the student bearing the number responds 'I am it, Sir.' Do not instances like these give warrant to a philosopher to maintain that what is being understood till now as 'the speaker I' can be *demonstated*, as a thing can be, to the public at large? And then we can once again speak in a Strawsoian vein, viz., that 'the speaker I' *can* be recognised as an *ontological* entity in as much as it is *identifiable*. And how else is it identifiable except through its *body*? The spectre of Strawson's 'M'-predicates seems to be haunting us!

Now, the way to counter the foregoing observations—which seem to imperil Bhattacharyya's theory of '*the* Subject' and try to get Bhattacharyya recognise the demonstrability and the identifiability of 'the subject'—is to confront the opponent with the two following questions, viz., 'Who demonstrates the subject?' and 'Who identifies it?'

Immediately as these two questions are posed for him, the opponent would readily make the rejoinder '*The Subject itself* demonstrates itself'. But the notion of 'demonstration' has the notion of the 'public' built into it. 'Demonstration' is for public consumption. So what can be the point in saying, as the opponent does, that 'The Subject *demonstrates itself*'? In common parlance, we use the expression 'showing off', imputing conceit to the person who 'shows off'. Conceit is a moral fault. And 'the Subject' is at the furthest remove from moral approbation or condemnation. It may be said by the opponent that 'the Subject' points at itself. Surely, demonstrative pointing has no moral tinge in it. But if 'the Subject' demonstrates or points at itself, then it must be in another's interest. So it says 'This is I'. But now, construed thus, the demonstrative symbol 'this' *loses* all its force. As Professor Bhattacharyya interprets it, '...*this* as distinct from me is... false, the fact being I'.[11] To use Professor Bhatacharyya's expression in another context, the predicate here 'usurps' the place of the Subject. Actually, 'This is I' is no subject-predicate statement. What, then, can be the point of making some such statement? The statement is at bottom a symbolisation : it is the subject's symbolising itself through the word 'I', acentuating its self-consciousness and pointing to others that it is necessarily 'spoken as symbolised' and that it necessarily outreaches all symbolisation. So '*this*' does not function as a demonstrative symbol in 'This is I'. On the contrary, in such a context, 'this'—which is ordinarily used to demonstrate some *thing*, some *object*—loses all its *demostrative force* and loses itself in the subject's symbolising of itself. Conceived as standing for an object, 'this' has no relevance to 'the *Subject*', 'the speaker-I'. The subject is no 'this', no *object*, no demonstrable entity, no entity whatever. It is no ontological reality, no *padārtha*. *There can be no ontology of 'the subject'*, of '*the speaker I'*. Earlier, we said that *each one* of us as 'the speaker I' *to itself and* as the 'speaker I' to *the other* constitutes the matrix of communication; and is therefore *anterior* to communication. And now we add : 'the speaker I', as *ante-dating* communication, cannot be assigned any mark or criterion/criteria/description culled from our communicative discourse.

To speak more acutely, 'the speaker I' or 'the subject' *cannot assign to itself* any mark, criterion and so on.

And immediately as one recognises this point, something strikingly novel in Bhattacharyya's throught appears before one's mind's eye. It is the dimensional difference between the subject as something that has been assigned some mark, some criterion (criteria), some description etc. *by another;* and the subject as it is *to itself—criterion-less, non-descriptive*. When, e.g. someone else asserts my identity over a period of time on the basis of some marks, featurers, roles, institutional considerations and so on, I may accept his statement. Again, I myself may have to establish my identity for someone who is to be statisfied with my credentials for some favour or benefit I seek from him. But in both the cases, my identity is established *for others;* and that on the basis of marks or criteria or institutional situation or whatever that would count as important—in the context of the given situation—*for others*. Again, some one may of course be wrong in what he says to establish my identity, and then, I may correct him. Still, in correcting him, I speak in those terms which may help *others* to know the correct identity about me. But the terms of identity are *determined by others* and are *for others*.

But *I* do not have to establish my identity *to myself*. My name, role, caste, clan, office, place of birth (place of birth forms part of the full name in states of South India) and whatever count with *others* to establish my identity. But to myself, I have no name, no clan—nothing. I am, to myself, *nāmagotrahīna*.[12] So, there is this dimensional difference : a judgment purporting to establish my identity and made by *someone* else *may not be denied by me*, but then, on that ground, it need not be *asserted* by me either. What is judgment for *others* about me is *no* judgment *for me*. What really accounts for this dimensional difference? It is this—that '*the* Subject', '*the* speaker I' is no ontological *entity*, and what is no ontological entity cannot be the logical subject. '*The* Subject', 'the I' cannot be placed in the predicational context. *The logical subject and the speaker-subject belong to two distinct universes of discourse*. 'The Subject' is no entity; and so, when Realism of 'the Subject' is advocated, as e.g. by the Naiyāyika, the Subject is, *consistently with the Realist tenet*, conceived as an entity, a *padārtha*. But the Realist, consistent though he is in understanding the Subject as an entity, speaks really in two distinct philosophical tones of voice: what is 'the Subject' is no entity. So the Realist has to speak in the entity-language and cease from talking of 'the Subject'. But if he wants to eat the cake and have it too, then he has to give his case away to Idealism. Idealism maintains an epistemological thesis, while Realism maintains an ontological thesis.

One last consideration related to the demand for the Subject's identification. In Strawson's ontological scheme, nothing can be admitted which is not identifiable. So Strawson argues : (i) one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneslef *on condition* that one can ascribe them to *others*; and (ii) one can ascribe states of consciousness to others if one can identify others. But (iii) one cannot identity others merely as centres of consciousness. : one can identify others only through bodies. Reverting to the context of our discussion, one may adopt a Strawson-like stance and maintain that 'the Subject' of Bhattacharyya's conception would be admissible if it were identifiable, and it would be identifiable only through its *body*. (As Strawson states the regulative idea of his ontology : 'No entity without identity'). What we have, following Bhattacharyya, called 'the Subject' would be called by Strawson 'pure ego'. And 'pure ego' does not exist for him, as it cannot be identified, it being conceived as non-bodily.

Prefatory to the discussion on Strawson's contentions in so far as they bear on the present context, a distinction has to be made between two *distinct* contexts, viz., *ontological* and *subjective*. Ontologically indeed, a 'person' of Strawson's ontology is identified through the person's body. But it is not 'the Subject' : 'the Subject' is what calls itself 'I', is the 'Speaker-I'. We have seen that there are contexts in which one utters 'I', i.e., contexts like 'Here am I', 'This is I' etc. In saying 'I am'—remember that Indian utterance pregnant with significance viz., *'aham asmi'*—I have the consciousness of *being I*, being *inward*, being *introspective* : it was almost a constant refrain with Professor Kalidas Bhattacharyya that what is subjective is what is inward. So, from the point of view of what Professor K.C. Bhattacharyya calls the 'inwardising of consciousness', the Strawsonian identifiability-requirement is purely out of place, because 'the Subject' or the 'speaker I' or the inward consciousness is no ontological entity to *be identified, pointed at, or demonstrated.* A subject, a 'speaker-I' can of course understand another 'speaker-I', but such understanding is not mediated by any *body*, any *thing*, any *entity;* but through 'I', i.e., through the another 'speaker-I's calling itself *'I'*.

Further, we do not hazard any guess about 'the Subject' being bodily/non-bodily. That would be proceeding in the way of those philosophers of ancient times who used to speculate whether the soul is simple or has parts, whether it is substance or not, whether it is numericaly identical over stretches of time etc. etc. Kant, we know, criticised these 'paralogisms' or illicit syllogisms. Philosophers concerned with such arguments or transcendental inferences were called by him 'Dogmatic' metaphysicians because they did not (according to Kant) conform to the *noetic* requirement, i.e., the requirement that their speculations should conform to the conditions of knowledge. In like manner, Bhattacharyya would build his philosophy of 'the Subject' on *'ahaṃbodha'*, the consciousness of *being I.* 'I', in fact, would symbolise for him the inwardising of consciousness. A conception that is apparently, so simple, and is yet so ingressed with significance, the 'I' *determines* for Bhattacharyya the lineaments of his theory of knowledge.

The 'I' indeed stands at the apex of his theory of knowledge. It is not the 'soul' of what Kant called (and what he could not approve of as it failed to conform to the conditions of knowledge) Rational Psychology. But then it is not again a 'presupposition' (as Kant conceived the self to be) of knowledge, because the consciousness of the 'speaking I' is the consciousness of *being* 'I'. *The consciousness of being 'I' 'annuls'*[13] *the distinct being, i.e. the distinct ontological reality of the subject.* Again, the consciousness of being the subject (*aham asmi*) is *not* the Cartesian 'sum': because the 'sum' is first sought to be derived from 'cogito', which again is derived from 'dubito' in Descartes's rationalist logic; and, *secondly*, this logic itself derives all its validity for Descartes from a veracious or truthful God. '*Aham asmi*' or, the consiousness of *being* the subject, is not *arrived* at through the resolution of any doubt about it. This is not an *obiter dicta* with Bhattacharyya. From what he written on the matter, we may show that he *has* an argument which strikes at the very root of any doubt about '*aham asmi*' or consciousness of being the subject.

The argument may be stated thus:

1. Consciousness of the subject is consciousness of the *being* the subject, of *being* 'I'.
2. Consciousness of *being* the subject is consciousness that 'annuls' the 'distinct being' of the subject from consciousness itself.
3. Doubting is a conscious *act*.
4. The act, *as an act*, must be directed upon something *distinct* from the act.
5. But the subject is *not* distinct from the consciounsess of it.
6. Therefore, 'consciousness of the subject' cannot be regarded as the same as 'doubting as a conscious act'.
7. Therefore, the subject cannot be said to be presented before any doubting consciousness.
8. If it is presented, it thereby *nullifies* doubting as a conscious act.
9. Therefore, the subject or the consciousness of being the subject, i.e., '*aham asmi*', cannot be doubted.

This argument stipulates one requirement each for (i) the *dubtitandum* and (ii) *doubting* as a conscious *act*. The *dubitandum* can only be *for* doubting as a conscious act, and doubting as a conscious act can only be fixed *on* the *dubitandum*. What is, then, the resulting idea? It is this : the subject cannot be a *dubitandum*, because conciousness of the subject cannot be the same as doubting as a conscious act.

Much more remarkable than the argument that we have constructed from Bhattacharyya's writings is the profound insight of Bhattacharyya behind it. Consciousness of being the subject or being 'I' is, as we have seen earlier, inwardising consciousness, i.e., consiousness which has no *distinct being* for it, nothing alien to it. And inwardising as it is, consciousness *cannot be* afflicted by doubt. Why? For, what, after all, is the inwardness of consciousness but the consciousness of being, inward being 'I'? It is an *identity which is not judgmental or propositional* but only 'felt' in its inwardness (cp. Bhattacharyya : 'The subject is conceived...as the felt detachment from the object') and only symbolised in *'aham asmi'*. *'Aham asmi'* can be understood in Bhattacharyya's words in another context : it is consciousness of "*what is not distinct from the consciousness of it*'. (See his *Studies in Kant,* Chapter on 'Idea of Transcendental Philosophy'). And it is the felt inwardness 'of the Subject' or the 'I' which uproots all doubt regarding it, whether doubt is taken to be the mental *act* of doubting or to be what such 'act' is fixed *upon.* To the consciousness of being 'I', i.e., to the consciousness of the subject it *does not even seem* possible that the consciousness of the subject *may not be* the consciousness of the subject or may be distinct from the consciousness of the subject. Descartes' apprehension that he may be deluded or hoodwinked by a malignant creature into believing that he exists is completely otiose. The possibility of something *distinct* from itself is what counts as doubt for consciousness of the subject. But consciousness of the subject is consciousness of what is *not* distinct from the consciousness. Thus the consciousness of the subject *rules out doubt as such.* Consciounsess of the subject cannot even be *seemingly* distinct from itself : and *just this* is Bhattacharyya's insight. The foegoing argument seeks only to spell out that insight of his. In Indian terminology, the *svagatatā* of consciousness gets *hāniprāpta* in *saṃśaya*. Pure inward consciousness or the subject comes to be curbed or hindered by doubt. Doubt of the subject is a pathological state of the mind. Involving as it does the possibility that consciousness may be distinct from itself, doubt is a *standing scandal to the subject. It stands only to be impugned.*

What to speak of doubt, even any attempted negation of the subject comes to be foreclosed by Bhattacharyya's insight. Because the subject or inward consicousness cannot be distinct from itself, it cannot be 'meant', cannot be a *padārtha*; but, since the subject is not cannot even be conceived to be a *padārtha*, therefore there cannot be any meaningful negation of the subject, 'Perhaps I *am not*', 'Perhaps I am deluded by a malignant creature into thinking that I exist', these are outpourings of pathological doubt, and not any legitimate doubt, which can arise only within the limits of what can be 'meant'. The subject, however, is (i) not even 'tried to be *negated*' in Bhattacharyya's words, because it is (ii) not even tried to be *meant*, and this again is because it is (iii) not even tried to be made *distinct* from itself. Trying as it does the feat of imagining what *cannot be imagined* by consciousness (that it may be distinct from itself), doubt is, from the point of the subject, nothing more than *warped imagination*. Doubt pulverizes, *breaks* the tranquil equipoise of the inwardness or subjectivity of consciousness.

The Upshot of the Philosophy of the Subject :

1. All Bhattacharyya's philosophical reflections on 'the Subject' veer round his notion of the subject as 'the speaker-I'. It is not, strictly speaking, 'Speaker of I' but 'Speaker-I'. Actually (what to speak of Bhattacharyya's) from any philosopher's point of view, "I am the speaker of 'I'" is ludicrous. A point may still be sought to be given to this from of speech. And it is this : this form of speech makes it clear that when a speaker uses the word 'I', he does it as a member of the community of speakers of the word. And he can do it as a member of the community of such speakers is so far as he, like other membes of the community, understands the meaning of the word. But, as we have seen, Bhattacharyya maintains that in that *general meaning* (which is *any* speaker), the 'I' is not *used* by any speaker. For one who *understands* the *meaning* of 'I', a speaker, i.e., *any* speaker is the denotative meaning of 'I'. But for one who *utters* 'I', there is a *semantic* difference between *a/any* speaker and an *actual* speaker. *Any* speaker is a *meant* entity. But an *actual* speaker of 'I' marks itself off from whatever is *meant*. So, as we have said heretofore, in the context of the 'actual' speaker of 'I', 'I' is user-

specific. In saying ‘I am the speaker of ‘I’’’, the speaker intends to convey that he is *the* ‘I’, not that he is *one of the ‘I’-s. He* is the speaker of ‘I’, he is *the* subject, he is the ‘speaking I’. ‘‘Speaker of ‘I’’’ is but the *‘I’,* which is but the *speaker,* which is but *the current speaker, i.e., ‘the speaker I’.*

2. Bhattacharyya thus acutely *delimits* the *kind* of discourse about *the subject,* and thereby carves out for the Vedānta doctrine of his native tradition the semantic field in virtue of which it is uniquely distinguished from both Idealistic views of the subject and the Realistic views of the subject.

The importance of Bhattacharyya’s book *The Subject as Freedom* in this context is yet to be appreciated. *It is here that for the first time the distinctive language of Idealism is pinpointed. The Idealist thesis is not ontological.* The Idealist does not, indeed cannot, maintain that ‘object’ as an *ontological entity* is dependent on the subject as *another ontological entity.* Realism is, of course, an ontological thesis; and, quite consistently, it holds that ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind’ is *another* ontological entity alongside things and events and processes and so on (*minus* of course artifacts). To which, Idealists before Bhattacharyya have *all too-baldly* replied that ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind’ is the basic ontological reality into which ‘the whole chair of heaven and the furniture of the earth’ can be resolved. The reply is bald, because the Idealist thesis of mind-dependence of object has been stated *without any prior critical enquiry into the kind of semantic disscourse in terms of which only the thesis can be stated.* Idealists before Bhattacharyya have failed to see that (i) the very concept of ‘object’ (which retains its Idealistic core) as different from the concept of ‘thing’ (thing-language is the paradigm language for Realism)—is ‘precipitated’[14] in ‘self-evident conscioussness’ (this,.too has not been semantically articulated before Bhattacharyya), and that (ii) self-evident consciousness is the self or the subject symbolising itself, ‘incarnating’ itself (in Bhattacharyya’s diction—which is more actue—*in ‘I’*). Without the semantics of the ‘Speaker-I’, the Idealist thesis is, at its worst, an *obiter dicta* and at its best, a string of words being *neither* a factual thesis that could be subject to veritification in sense-experience or to assessment by scientific menthodology, *nor* a philosophical or semantic thesis about ‘object’. Idealists have, of course, insisted that their thesis is philosophical and not factual. They have sought to buttress this claim by deducing 'object' from its *knowability* to subject. So derived, the Idealist thesis becomes non-factual. But just by advancing a non-factual thesis, an Idealist cannot take refuge in the secure haven of his philosophical theory. From the way the Idealist derives his thesis, it can only be said that his thesis is, actually, analytic, viz., 'object is known'. But for the Realist, it is very easy to refute this thesis factually. The only way the Idealist can retain his thesis is by deriving it is the way Bhattacharyya, for one, does—viz., by deriving 'object' from the very linguistic structure of the subject, i.e., from the necessary symbolisation of the subject in the object-word 'I'. Idealism first gets its *semantic terra firma* in Bhattacharyya's hands. Self-consciousness is either symbolised in 'I' or is just incommunicable. But it is *not* incommunicable : how else could a science of self (*ātmavidyā* in Indian diction) be possible?

3. If the possibility of founding a science of self can be envisaged on the basis of 'I' or the subject, then it will be clear that Bhattacharyya is not confined to any petrified notion of the subject, as 'the speaker I' may appear to be. Lurking within what is apparently a mere word, viz., 'I' is the dynamics of the subject's symbolising by itself of its interiority. And this is where the notion of the 'speaker-I' assumes comprehensiveness both *programmatically* and *doctrinally*. Initially giving the *intimation of interority*, i.e., *presaging* interiority, the notion by virtue of its internal dymanics, impels the Subject to move onwards, to be progressively oriented to—what Bhattacharyya calls the Subject as *freedom*. The notion thus involves the suggestion that the programme should be executed methodically by progressively deepening the interiority of the Subject.

Here three points should be clearly noted. *First*, the progressive dynamics of consciousness that Bhattacharyya envisages should not be interpreted as a variant of Hegel's Dialectics. Dialectics, at any stage of it, starts with the *given* antithesis of the subject and the object, and proceeds to the comprehensive synthesis of the subject and the object. But the progressive dynamics of consicousness which Bhattacharyya envisages consists in progressively outgrowing objectivity on the part of the Subject, inward as it is in its direction.

The *second* point relates to the distinction between 'symbolisation' and 'self-symbolisation'. A symbol is determined by many consideration, viz., considerations of religious mentality, a nation's ideals, a belief-system that may be sustained and fortified by a symbol, and whatever. Important though a symbol (or some symbols) may be, they have an element of *contingency* about them in as much as they may, for situational considerations, be *changed*. But the word 'I' is the self-symbolising by the subject of its interiority. The subject is conscious of itself as *necessarily* symbolised in 'I'. Either the subject is taken to be symbolised in 'I am', or one cannot talk of the subject. If it is asked 'what does the subject gain by such symbolising of itself—let alone its symbolising for other?', the answer would be that it is *a self-consicous phenomenological enterprise* that the subject is engaged in when it symbolises itself. Such *phenomenological* enterprise—such a phenomenology of 'I'—has *two* sides : first, it distinguishes the subject from all that is *distinct, meant, padārtha; secondly,* it is oriented to the achievement of the *subject as unmeant,* as not distinct from the consciousness of itself, as 'conscious freedom'. Such a phenomenology of 'I' is really a *semantics of inwardness*. It is a philosophical enterprise. Had it not been for the 'I' symbol, the subject could not be spoken of. Only it is not spoken as 'meant'. It is not unspeakable. If it were so, epistemology or phenomenology of the subject could not be founded. What is 'speakable' may be speakable as 'meant' or speakable as 'un-meant'. The subject is not 'meant', and is therefore no *padārtha*. It is *a-padārtha*. But it is *not a-vācya,* i.e. unspeakable like 'hare's horn' or 'son of a barren mother'. It is not indeed *padavācya,* but then is *not pada-avācya* either. Metaphysical realities as impugned by the Logican Positivists would be *pada-avācya,* not meant by words, meaningless. But the subject is *a-padavācya,* i.e., spoken (in words the word 'I') but as unmeant.

To do full justice to what Bhattacharyya writes on 'meaning', we have to see how his views emerge out of what he has in mind regarding two important systems of Indian philosophy. It appears that Bhattacharyya has in mind the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosophy of his tradition, and that he seeks to set the Vedānta of his tradition in perspective by re-defining or by re-casting the Vedānta view of the subject.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, *that* which is the *artha* of a *pada,* i.e., that *object* which is the meaning of a word is real.

This quite accords with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *ontological Realism which is also a realism of word.* On this theory, for anything to be to be an *object* of knowledge (*viṣaya*) is for it to be 'meant' in words, to be a *padārtha.* What is meant (*padārtha*) and what is object (*viṣaysa*) of knowledge are the same, i.e., same ontological entity. What one knows is what one can *mean* by a word, and what one can mean is an *entity. Viṣaya* or object is delineated by *pada* in so far as it is *padavācya,* i.e., meant by the word. What cannot be meant by any word, i.e. what cannot be *padavācya* is no object, i.e., *viṣaya,* and what is no *viṣaya* is not real, i.e., is *not to be admitted in semantics and in ontology.* So in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, only *padavācyaviṣaya,* i.e., *artha* or object meant by *pada* can be admitted in philosophical discourse; which for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers is semantical-cum-ontological or ontological-cum-semantical.

We have now to understand how Bhattacharyya affiliates his vedāntic cast of mind to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In executing the task, Bhattacharyya brings out how the subject of the Vedānta conception does not fit into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika model of discourse, how a *new semantics* must be founded for the Vedānta theory. Thereby, Bhattacharyya *adds to the corpus of Vedānta* (like the old *Bhaṣyakāras*) : *what is more, he gives new content to the traditional idealism of the subject.* That ghostly entity at long last comes into the purview of intelligible discourse. The question of questions here is : 'how would Bhattacharyya bring his analysis of the word 'I' by a speaker to bring upon the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory?'. For Bhattacharyya, 'I' is not used by a speaker to *mean.* How are words used (in the context of their literal use)? They are *pada-s* and as *pada-s* they have *artha.* To say that they have *artha-s* is to say that they *have accusatives* : the accusatives are of course real for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, but the point of saying that the word have accusatives is to bring out the point, as Bhattacharyya does in refining the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the relationship between word and object, that they *fix upon something distinct.* To Bhattacharyya, the concept of distinct-being *is built into the concept of the meaning of words.* 'Distinct being', again in Bhattacharyya's insightful expression, is 'spoken of'. The word 'of' is of capital importance for understanding how Bhattacharyya *re-fines* (so to say) the concept of 'what is meant'.

And now the *contrast* appears in Bhattacharyya's mind's eye between 'I' and other words, between Idealism and Realism or *padārtha-tattva*: speaking straightforwardy and acutely, '*the* speaker-I' is not spoken of as distinct from the word 'I'. The word's meaning force is *nullified* by the 'speaker-I' when he uses the word. For the subject as the user of the word 'I', it has no distinct being to be fixed upon; it is 'the subject', the speaker, the 'speaker-I'.

And now to the third point. It is related specifically to the semantics of 'the speaker-I'. With regard to this concept or notion of 'the speaker-I', the solispsist sees his chance to exploit Bhattacharyya's thesis in his philosophical interest. Does Bhattacharyya's view that when a speaker uses the word 'I' to 'express' himself (as he says in *The Subject as Freedom* in the chapter on 'The Notion of Subjectivity') he uses it not with meaning of the word which is 'any speaker' but only as 'expressing' himself—have any solipsistic ring about it?

Answer to this question should be preceded by working out the internal logic of solipsism as far as it bears on the question.

The solipsist's argument may be stated thus :

i. No meaning or sense can be given to the expression 'user of a word' apart from the actual using of a word, i.e., apart from an actual user's use of a word. (This step in the argument derives its force, if any, from Berkeleyianism)

ii. No sense, therefore, can be given to the expression "user of the word I" apart from an actual use of the word of 'I'.

iii. No sense, therefore, can be given to the expression "actual use of the word I" apart from any using of the word 'I'. For, a *supposed* another person's *supposed* use of 'I' makes meaning for me in *my actual* use of 'I'.

iv. Therefore, *I (i.e., the solipsist) alone* can, sensibly or meaningfully, be said to use the word 'I'.

v. Therefore (the solipsist would now exploit Bhattacharyya's diction in his own interest) *I alone* am 'the speaker-I'.

And when Bhattacharyya says that the meaning of the word 'I' is 'any speaker', the solipsist would retort "'Any' does not make sense apart from 'this'". So the notion of 'any speaker' boils down to the notion of 'this speaker', i.e., '*this specific* I'. 'I' is nothing if not *individual* speaker-specific. And again, when Bhattacharyya says that 'different persons may be *understood* to be using it' (each with reference to himself), the solipsist would react by saying that '*understanding*' user-specificity would deprive 'user-specificity' just of its very specificity. User-specificity of 'I' is not *general*, i.e. such that it could be understood with reference to *another* I.

To all this, Bhattacharyya's reply can be elaborated as follows:

1. The *meaning* of a word is different from the *use* of the word. *Understanding* the meaning of the word 'I' is different from the *use* of the word.
2. User-specificity of 'I', as a notion, does not exclude the plurality of I's, i.e., of the users of the word.
3. One can understand *another* speaker when the latter uses 'I' "not through the meaning of word but through the word." Saying (as Bhattacharyya does) that one can understand different persons as using the word 'I' does not commit one to the position that one brings the different persons under a common 'I', *an 'I'-sāmānya*. Specific I-s do not derive their specificity from a common specificity.
4. Understanding *another* person when he expresses himself through the word 'I' is actually understanding that person as *symbolized* in 'I'. Such understanding of the 'speaking I', as symbolized in 'I', is more than the privative psychological understanding of 'I', to which the meaning of 'I' is reduced by the solipsist. It is 'more' in this that it can accomodate the possibility of other I-s or other 'speaker-I'-s.

To wind up the discussion : the solipsist talks of *his* 'I', but would not admit into his philosophical scheme other 'I's, *other* 'speaker-I's. He fails to see that *even he* talks of *his* I in a *symbol*, that is, in 'I' which is *objective*. It is this objective symbol that is the pointed to the subject, apparently a ghostly entity. The subject is spoken as *necessarility* symbolised : *symbolisation is woven into the structure of the subject's consciousness itself* - it is *anubiddha* by *ahaṃśabda*. Had it not been for such symbolisation, the subject could not be 'spoken' (Bhattacharyya's language), be expressed (our language). As it is, however, it is spoken as symbolised. And this *symbolization* does away with its *privacy*.

And, as for the solipsist, he—apprehending that the user-specificity of 'I' would communized and so compromised if another person's (i.e. of persons other than the solipsist) use of 'I' is recognized, seeks to *reduce* the notion of another person's use of 'I' to *his* use of 'I'. According to him, sense can be made of or given to the notion of another person's use of 'I' if this notion is *psychologized*, i.e., reduced to *his* private and actual use of 'I'. But *first*, a private use of 'I' is of no use to be reckoned with, lacking as it does any objective determinant. *Secondly*, the solipsist's apprehension that a concession to a non-solipsist to use 'I' would *communize* 'I' is unfounded. The notion of 'I' being symbolized in 'I', as advanced by Professor Bhattacharyya, cuts through the notion of any communized I, and the notion of a solipsistic I. If solipsism were true, then even the solipsist's 'I' could not be talked of *by him*, what to speak of *others* talking of it. But it is talked of by him. Therefore, solipsism is not true. But how is the solipsist's 'I' spoken of except in the 'I' symbol?

And now to the larger construction to which Bhattacharyya's entire analysis of the use of 'I' is oriented, which in fact is the acme of his philosophy of the subject. It is this : the 'I' or 'the speaker I' is the necessary symbol through which the subject is understood or becomes the *object of shared understanding* that can be *articulated* in a definite philosophy, which he calls Spiritual Psychology—which we may call *ātmavidyā* following the Indian idiom.

And so we finally come to see how much the insight of Bhattacharyya has captured in the simple-seeming word 'I', and what a rich crop it yields.

First, the terms of the Idealistic discourse have been for the first time (we claim) set forth by Bhattacharyya. No 'mind' or 'consciousness' or 'spiritual' substance can serve as the basic concept of Idealism. These are not comparable to the *felt* interiority of the subject as symbolised in 'I', to the 'I'-symbol *being* the I or *the* subject. If Idealism is genuinely to be the 'philosophy of the subject', if Idealism is to accord primacy to the subject over 'object', then this claimed primacy must have some warrant. And where can it have warrant except in the consciousness of the subject as symbolised in 'I''? The word is objective, and yet this objectivity is *appropriated* by the subject or I. The 'I' is a meaning for Bhattacharyya in the sense that it has a distinct appearence: we have already seen that the concept of distinct being is woven into the concept of 'what is meant' (for Bhattacharyya). And yet, its distinctness is nullified by the subject, by the subject in its interiority. The semantic notion of 'I' symbol, then, is the gateway to the subject. So Idealism can only derive all its force from this notion and discard all ontological speculations on 'mind' or 'spiritual substance' or 'self'.

Secondly, Idealism should secure itself from Cartesian doubt. Because the subject is no *distinct* being, no *padārtha*, therefore it cannot be doubted. As we have seen, doubt makes consciousness an object, i.e., it pulverizes the distinctionless subject and makes it appear as distinct from itself. Descartes had as though *lost himnself to himself* and had to appeal to a God to give him aid for being self-conscious. But even the *possible distinctness of the subject* or consciousness in its interiority cannot be entertained in consciousness. Doubt of consciousness in ruled out not because it is *impossible*, but because it is *unmeaning :* its possible meant-ness or distinctness is *nullified* in consciounsess that is *not* distinct from itself. The philosophy of the Subject is a complete reversal of Realism of the Subject, for which the subject is a *padārtha*. Descartes's doubt undermined his Idealism and misconstrued the subject as a *padārtha*.

Thirdly, if the philosophy of the subject is not to be any theory of object, any *padārthatattava,* then its mode of philosphising must be a complete break from that of the latter. *Padārthatattva* seeks to find out the categorial form of object as a Naiyāyika or an Alexander may look for. In contrast, the Philosophy of the Subject unravels the different grades of interiority. towards the in-depth realisation of the subject. *Padārthatattva* talks of 'meaning', *ātmavidyā* talks of meaning *'symbols'*. Through such symbolising, *ātmavidyā* elaborates the progressive insight into the Subject, and elaborates the grades of subjectivity oriented to the achievement of *the* Subject or *the* Interior.

The Philosophy of the Subject may then appear to be a *phenomenology*. However, it is *not* Husserlian in temper and in character. Husserl, despite his phenomenological programme of 'bracketing' the naturalistic attiude, could not to the end of the chapter overcome psychologism. He had no notion of the subject as necessarily symbolised (and thus objectified) in 'I'. Contrasted to Husserl's phenomenology, *ātmavidyā* is phenomenology as self-symbolising through the word 'I'. It has a *semantic core* which is not so with Husserl's phenomenology, although for it, semantics of 'I' resolves itself into the symbolising of the interiority of consciousness. Here, the *word* is the *thing*. To adapt Bhattacharyya's words in another context, "The word directly refers to the thing, expresses the thing, touches it".[15]

References :

1. *SAF*. SP, Vol. II, p. 83.
2. *Ibid.*
3. SAF, SP. Vol. II p. 20. See also p. 83. Underline author's.
4. *Individuals*, p. 30.
5. *Ibid.* p. 15.
6. *Ibid.* p. 30.
7. *Ibid.* p. 30.
8. *SAF. SP*. Vol. II, p. 19.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
11. *SAF*, SP. Vol. II, p. 20.
12. In my paper for the Indian Philosophical Congress (Gauhati Session, 1977) entitled 'The Self to itself and the Self for Others', I discussed this point at some length.
13. The expression is Professor Bhattachayya's. See Chapter X, *SAF*, SP. Vol. II, p. 88.
14. See 'The Concept of Philosophy' in *SP* Vol. II.
15. *Studies in Vedāntism*. Section on *Vedānta Logic*. SP. Vol. I.

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3. Bhattacharya, K.C., *Studies in Vedāntism* in SP, Vol. I.
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5. Strason, P.F., *Individuals*, London, Methuen, 1959.

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BOOK REVIEW

Dilipkumar Mohanta

NIRVĀṆA IN CANDRAKĪRTI'S PRASANNAPADĀ by G.C. Nayak, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Rastrapati Nivas, Shimla, 2006 ISBM: 81-7986-066-3, H/B Rs. 200/-

This small treatise is an outcome of Professor G.C. Nayak's pen during his stay as a Fellow of Indian Institute of Advanced Study at Rastrapati Nivas, Shimla during 2001-2004. This is another evidence of Nayak's continuous engagement with Madhyamaka philosophy and of his application of analytical acumen in interpreting texts of Indian Philosophy. Nayak's *Mādhayamika Śūnyatā: A Reappraisal* was published by Indian Council of Philosophical Research in 2001. But unlike that, the present treatise concentrates more on Candrakīrti's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's view on Nirvāṇa. Though Th. Stcherbatsky has rendered Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* with Candrakīrti's commentary into English, that translation is again the source of many misinformations, according to many scholars of Buddhism. Nayak's work has carefully handled this problem, and in my opinion, he has ably corrected some sources of misinterpretation. 'Madhyamaka philosophy is not another metaphysical Absolutism', remarks Nayak. The author has made a distinction in his interpretation of *śūnyatā*, highlighting its affinity with the doctrine of other schools of Indian Philosophy; and one of such interesting comparisons made by Nayak is Candrakīrti's interpretation of *Nirvāṇa* and Advaita Vedantist Vidyāraṇya's interpretation of *Mokṣa*. For Nayak, neither Candrakīrti nor Vidyāraṇya denies the reality of the world of our experience, and the charges of 'world negation' and 'nihilism' against both of them are unfounded. For a Mādhyamika as well as for an Advaita Vedantist, the world has a functional reality, and to perform worldly activities, it is not necessary that "the world should be taken as ultimately real" (p. 19). According to Nayak, it is abunadantly clear why "nirvāṇa does not point to sheer anihilation, nor does it refer primarily to a state hereafter; it is attained here and now" (p. 26).

The introductory chapter has judiciously set 'the tone and the tune' of the book. The second chapter explains *nirvāṇa* as the cessation of 'essentialist-thought construction' and the author has ably developed his thesis with reference to 'the non-substantiality thesis' of the Buddhist. All efforts to build up metaphysical theories are futile in the long run, because all of them are imaginary, the products of *kalpanā*, an exercise of dogmatism. Nayak has the ground to identify *nirvāṇa* with critical insight. The third chapter contains the debate between the Essentialist 'thought construction' arguments and the counterarguments by the philosophers who uphold 'essence-lessness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). Nayak has tried to trace the origin of *svabhāvavāda* in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. Here, Nayak is faithful to the text *Prasannapadā* in his criticism of the claim for 'intrinsic nature' (*svabhāva*) of things. For a Madhayamaka Philósopher like Candrakīrti, understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* leads to the cessation of the thought constructions (*prapañcopaśama*) and it is the highest good (*śiva*). Candrakīrti identifies *pratītyasamutpāda* with *śūnyatā*, and the realization of this leads to "freedom from thought construction" (p. 44). It is also called *madhyamāpratipad*, rising above or going beyond all the exterme 'views', all 'isms', In Candrakīrti's words. "*paramārtho hi āryāṇām tusnīmbhāvaḥ*". In Nayak's interpretation, it is the highest good. But he cautions us by saying "let not anyone think that Candrakīrti here refers to an Absolute Reality about which one can at best be silent. Nayak's pointing out of the philosophically incorrect translation of this section of *Prasannapadā* by Stcherbatsky has been stated earlier. Nayak has explained the opponent's argument contained in '*Kim khalu āryāṇamupapattirnāsti*' and Candrakīrti's counterargument justifying the denial of any kind of philosophical assertion. For Candrakīrti, silence is the highest end for a philosophically enlightened person (*ārya*). "One who has attained *nirvāṇa* is an *ārya*, an enlightened person in the true sense of the term" (p. 47).

The fourth chapter explains the transition and development of the views about *nirvāṇa* from Early Buddhism to Madhyamaka Buddhism. Nayak here tries to locate the 'therapeutic imagery' of Candrakīrti to the teachings of the Buddha. The main attraction of the fifth chapter seems to be the understanding of *śūnyatā* as *mahākaruṇā*. As in his earlier work (2001), Nayak in the present treatise also has given emphasis on understanding the importance of *mahākaruṇā*. It is also know as *anukampā*, which is the result of the eardication of dogmatic views. Here also it is not Absolutism. But this claim remains unsubstantiated unless we bring the logical background of it, that is, the four cornered negation of the Madhyamakas. It is not only philosophically interesting, but also necessary to see how the denial of the law of Excluded Middle does not lead to the violation of the so called law of Contradiction. And here, Candrakīrti gives a novel interpretation (MMK, 1989 : 72). When a thesis, ''p or not p'' represents the law of contradiction in two extreme views of 'is' and 'is not' oriented logic, for a Madhyamaka like Candrakītri, 'p' is 'true for' a different class of individuals.[1] Here' the problem is 'how to make sense of what is denied'. But in case of the law of Excluded Middle, our concern, according to Candrakīrti, is 'how the denial can make sense' (MMK, 27/8 : 1989 : 72). A child of a barren woman cannot be classified either as eternal or non-eternal.[2]

Another question arises in this context. How can we reconcile the Madhyamaka view of *sarvadharmaśūnyatā* with *mahākaruṇā* of Lord Buddha? Is this *mahākaruṇā* not intrinisic to Lord Buddha? On Nayak's own admission, *mahākaruṇā* is ''one of the extraordinary, special qualities of Buddha alone''. Only by pure logical analysis from '*sarvam pratītyasamutpannam*', we may arrive at '*niḥsvabhāvatā*', essencelessness. But the question remains unanswered with regard to the *mahākaruṇā* of the Buddha. May we address this supra-logical question at a stage of mysticism? Where logic fails, silence may be the only resort. Does it not hint at the logical illumination of Madhyamaka mysticism? Nayak seems to stop here all on a sudden only after indicating the next step after the realization of essencelesness. Can we not at all address this apparently conflicting situation resorting to the two-fold division of truth, having the functional meaning and the ultimate meaning? This is the question Nayak left unanswred, perhaps to be addressed in future. I appreciate the author for inviting us to a journey for transcending ''the dichotomy of opposites by which our mind is overburdened all the time'' for the ''promotion of social harmony and peace''.

In short, *'Nirvāṇa in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā'* is a scholarly text based interpretation of some aspects of Madhyamaka philosophy. But the shortcomings of this book are its typographical mistakes, inaccurate transcription of some Sanskrit words in Roman script and avoidable repetitions in some cases. Again, this book would have been more interesting and comprehensive if the position of

Bhāvaviveka had been discussed even shortly; because without the awareness of the *Svatāntrika* position of Bhāvaviveka, the special importance of the *Prāsaṅgika* view of Candrakīrti remains comparatively obscure.

In fine, Nayak's treatise is a critical guide and a good expository addition to Madhyamaka philosophy and I hope that, both researchers and general readers of Buddhist philosophy will enjoy reading it.

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1. Tatra bālajana-jñāṇapekṣayā sarvametattathyam. Āryajñāna-pekṣayā tu sarvametanmṛṣā....etacca buddhānām anuśāsanam. Unmārgādapanīya vineyajanānu rūpyeṇa vā anuśāsanam (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* ed R.N. Pandey MLBD, Delhi, 1989 : 72).
2. Yadyapyevaṃ tathāpi vyavahārasatyānurodhena laukikatathyadvayā bhyupagamavattasyāpi samāropato lakṣaṇamucyatāmiti (MMK 18/8 : *Prasannapadā*).

   Nānārtho'syeti nānārtha-bhinnārtha na nānārtho-nānārthomithyārthaḥ (*MMK* 19/9).

BOOK REVIEW

Prabal Kumar Sen

Navya-Nyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa of Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna—with English transliteration, Translation and Explanatory Notes by Dr. Ramesh Chandra Das, Department of Special Assistance in Philosophy, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, 2006, xxxii + 210, Rs. 120.00.

Navya-Nyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa of Mahāmahopadhyāya Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna (who was an eminent scholar of Nyāya, and who also served as the Principal of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta) is a very good introduction to the technical terms used in Navya-Nyāya. It was published in 1891 with the title *Brief Notes on the Technical Terms of Navya-Nyāya.* The book, written in lucid Sanskrit, was out of print for a long time, and copies of it that were available in libraries also became unfit for use. In 1973, this book was reprinted from Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta under the title *Navya-Nyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa* (NNBP) along with the commentary *Suprabhā*, Bengali translation and an Appendix prepared by Mahāmahopādhyāya Kālīpada Tarkācārya, another eminent scholar of Nyāya. Since then, this book has drawn the attention of scholars, who have used it extensively for introducing students to the intricacies of Navya-Nyāya, the literature of which is replete with technical terms like *anuyogī, pratiyogī, avacchedaka, avacchinna, nirūpya, nirūpaka, pratibadhya, pratibandhaka, viśeṣya, prakāra* and so on. Of late, an English translation of this work of Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna, prepared by Dr. Ujjwala Jha, has been published by Asiatic Society, Calcutta. It is gratifying to see that a second English translation of this work along with explanatory notes has been prepared by Dr. Ramesh Chandra Das, whose commendable acquainatance with Western Logic has added a new dimension to this translation and notes. The extensive use of diagrams has made this book very useful for beginners, who may at first be put off by the long compound expressions used by Navya-Naiyāyikas. The symbols used in these diagrams have been explained in detail, along with the justification of the suitability of these symbols for perfoming the tasks assigned to them. Dr. Das has begun by introducing diagrams that are comparatively simple, and he has then proceeded to construct diagrams that are more complex, thus making it easier for the readers to become gradu quainted with the techniques of constructing these diagr The on of this book contains a short biography of Nyāyaratna, a brief account of the development of phy upto the period of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the author āmaṇi, where the four *pramāṇa*-s admitted by the Nyāya N ve been dealt with by employing technical terms that made ible for Gaṅgesa to formulate his views with precision and ar. Gradually, the technical terms used by him, which are ontology-neutral, began to be used by scholars of other disciplines as well; and hence, acquaintance with such terms and their employment became almost a prerequisite for the study of Grammar, Dharmaśāstras etc. as well. The rest of the Introduction deals with the symbols and the techniques of constructing diagrams corresponding to Sanskrit expressions containing the technical terms of Navya-Nyāya.

Dr. Das has split up the Sanskrit text of NNBP (printed in Devanagari script) into smaller sections, numbered them serially, and provided English transliterations of these sections. Each of such sections has been accurately translated into lucid English, and explanatory notes have been given whenever they are necessary. This book also contains (a) a key to transliteration (b) a list of symbols, (c) a glossary and (d) a bibliography. Dr. Das has thus made all possible attempts at making this book accessible to readers who do not have any prior acquaintance with the doctrines or terminology of Navya-Nyāya, and he has thereby earned the gratitude of readers, who are not conversant with Navya-Nyāya, but who nevertheless want to learn the techniques of Navya-Nyāya.

There are, however, some minor blemishes which might have been avoided by a careful revision of the draft and meticulous proof-reading; and we note them here, so that they may be removed when the next edition of this book is published.

A. There are many misprints, and we give a few examples here:

i. *mahāsarasvatai* (page for *Maṅglācaraṇa*), which should be *mahāsarasvatyai*,

ii. *Vārtika* (p. iv), which should be *Vārttika* (since it is derived from the word *Vṛtti*),

iii. *Bouddha-dhikāra* (p. iv), which shoul e *Bauddha-dhikkāra*, as some scholars ma

iv. *Prācinna Nyāya* (this occurs twice on p. v), w *dhikāra* (or *Prācīna Nyāya*,

v. *unullikhyamāna* (p. vii), which should be *unullikhyā*

vi. *sākṣāta* (p. viii). which should be *sākṣāt*,

vii. kālipada tarkācārya (p. ix), which should be Kālīpad Tarkācārya,

viii. *samanprasavātmikā* (p. 9), which should be *samānapras-avātmikā*,

ix. *saṁskār* (p. 28), which should be *saṁskāra*,

x. occurance (p. 29),

xi. *samabhāyaghaṭita* (p. 46), which should be *samavāyaghaṭita*,

xii. *pūvoktarūpā* (p. 63), which should be *pūrvoktarūpā*.

B. Almost throughout the book, *visarga* has been transliterated with the sign ':', even though in the 'Key to Transliteration', it has been correctly transliterated with the sign 'ḥ'. One wonders how this major discrepancy escaped the notice of the author or the proof-readers.

C. In some cases, the names of authors have been given in italics (e.g. pp. i-xiv, 8, 9 etc.) whereas in some other cases, such names have been printed in Roman font (e.g. pp. 8,9). This is rather curious.

D. There are some statements in this book that need to be modified. Thus, on p. iv, it has been stated that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa "wrote an independent commentaty on the *Nyāya-Sūtra* called *Nyāyamañjarī*." As a matter of fact, Jayanta Bhatta has discussed only the aphorisms belonging to the first and fifth chapter of *Nyāyasūtra*. Jayanta himself says about this work - "*tadekadeśaleśe tu kṛto'yaṁ vivṛtiśramaḥ*".

Again, on p.v, it has been said that '...the concept of *vyāpti* was discussed and reflected upon by the most brilliant minds for centuries. Yet it was not possible to find a sound characterization of it until Gaṅgeśa." it should be noted that between the periods of Udayana and Gaṅgeśa, a host of Naiyāyikas like Śrīvallabhācārya, Divākara Upādhyāya, Śaśadharācārya, Maḥikaḥtha Miśra, Taraṇi Misra, Sondaḍa Upādhyāya, Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya etc. gradully refined the concept of *vyāpti* and other related topic, and in Gaṅgeśa's work, many of their formulations have been noted and criticised. Moreover, the definition of *vyāpti* proposed by Gaṅgeśa was also amended extensively, and almost transformed beyond recognition by later commentators like Yajñapati Upādhyāya, Pakṣadhara Miśra, Vāsudeva Sārvabhuma, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Jagadīsa Tarkālaṁkāra and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya.

On page 2, it has been said that "the word *dharma* has been derived from the root *dhrin* by the use of the suffix *tup* implying 'that which is contained'." As a matter of fact, the suffix employed here is "*man*".

On p. 8, it has been said—"Uddyotakara, the author of *Nyāya-vārttika* in hic commentary on *Vārttika* 2.2.67 rightly points out that...". Obviously *Nyāya-vārttika* is not a commentary upon another earlier *Vārttika*—it happens to be a commentary on *Nyāya-bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana.

On p. 9, Dr. Das says—"Gautama uses the term *jāti* in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.2.18 the sense of a response by a contestant in the context of a formal debate....*Universal in this sense* is irrelevant to our present purpose" (emphasis added). Here, the expression "*jāti* in this sense is irrelevant..." would have been better. It is a fact that the word *jāti* has been used in the sense of 'universal' by Gautama in some of his aphorisms, though in aphorism no. 1.2.18, he uses it in an altogether different sense. But obviously, he was not thinking of universals in this case—though the employment of the same term for indicating two different things can lead to confusion. [It may be noted here that the term *upādhi* has also been used by Naiyāyikas in two different senses. *Upādhi* may mean an imposed property, and it may also mean something which pervades the *sādhya*, but does not pervade the *hetu* of an inference. In the second case, it is obviously not always a common property that fails to be a *jāti* for some reason and is, therefore, considered as an imposed property or other].

On p. 16, it has been said that "...*Rāmatva* is not an analysable imposed property (*sakhaṇḍopādhi*) and thus, it belongs to the category of unanalysable imposed property (*akhaṇḍopādhi*). So, by the same reasoning, Rāmatva-tva, Rāmatva-tva-tva etc. are cases of unanalysable imposed properties (*akhaṇḍopādhi-s*) like that of

Rāmatva''. The assumption behind this argument seems to be that if a certain property X is not a *sakhaṇḍopādhi*, then further abstractions on it (like X-ness, X-ness-ness etc.) would not also yield *sakhṇḍopādhi*-s. This, however, is not the case. Thus, *gotva* (i.e. cowness) is a universal proper (*jāti*), and since all *jāti*-s are unanalysable properties, they are not cases of *sakhaṇḍopādhi*. But *gotvatva* (i.e. cowness-ness) can be explicated as *sakalagovṛttitve sati gavetarāvṛttitvam*, (i.e. the property of inhering in all cow-individuals, while not inhering in individuals that are not cows), and is thus a *sakhaṇḍopādhi*, i.e. an analysable imposed property. In like manner, *abhāvatva* (i.e. the property of being a negative entity) is an *akhaṇḍopādhi* i.e., unanalysable imposed property, but the property *abhāvatva-tva*, (which is formed by adding another abstractive suffix *tva*) can be reformulated as the property that belongs to all negative entities, but does not belong to any positive entity; and hence, it also turns out to be an analysable imposed property (*sakhaṇḍopādhi*).

On p. 34, it has been said that ''...inherence is otherwise known as a relation between two inseparables (*ayutasambandha*)'' This statement is correct, but the phrase *ayutasambandha* is not found in any standard text of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school—the usual expression is ''*ayutasiddhayoḥ sambandhaḥ*''. The adjective *ayuta* thus pertains to the nature of the *relata* of *samavāya*, and not to the relation named *samavāya* itself.

On p. 36, Dr. Das has given some arguments in favour of the view the *samavāya* is one. The basic argument given by him is that unless *samavāya* is one, ''we have to assume the existence of more than one *samavāya-s*. Then there must be an individuating property (*sāmānyadharma*) residing in all cases of *samavāya*. In other words, we are compelled to accept the existence of a *jāti* (say *samavāyatva*) in *samavāya*....Again, since *jāti* resides in its loci by *samavāyasambandha*, we are back with *samavāya* again. Therefore the assumption of the existence of many *samavāya*-s is fallacious. So, *samavāya* must be one.''

This argument is based on the wrong assumption that all common properties are *jāti*-s which reside in their respective loci through the relation known as *samavāya*. While all *jāti*-s are common properties or individuating properties, the converse is not true—in fact, this is the moot point that is emphasized by drawing a distinction between *jāti* and *upādhi* (whether *akhaṇḍa* or *sakhaṇḍa*). The basic distinction between *jāti* and *upādhi* was underlined by Udayana when he drew up a list of *jātibādhaka*-s. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system admits that there are many *viśeṣa-s* and *abhāva*-s—but it does not follow therefrom that *viśeṣatva* and *abhāvata* are universals that reside by the relation of *samavāya* in *viśesa*-s and *abhāva*-s respectively; since admitting *viśeṣatva and abhāvatva* as instances of *jāti* would involve the defects of *rūpahāni and asambandha* respectively. Hence, they are treated as cases of *upādhi*. Moreover, the relata between which *samavāya* can obtain as a relation have been specified very clearly, and this has also been noted on p. 35 by Dr. Das himself. From this list, it becomes evident that *samavāya* itself is neither an *anuyogī* nor a *pratiyogī* of *samavāya*. Hence, the question of some property residing in *samavāya* through *samavāya* itself does not arise at all. Besides, if *samavāya* is one, and also becomes its own *anuyogī* or *pratiyogī*, then we would have to admit that the same thing can be its *ādhāra* and *ādheya*, which is counterintuitive; and if we admit that one *samavāya* has another *samavāya* as its *anuyogī* or *pratiyoī*, then that would invariably lead to an infinite regress. The usual argument for proving oneness (*ekatva*) of *samavāya* peoceeds by proving first that this relation is eternal (*nitya*), and then invoking the principle of parsimony (*lāghava*) for admitting only one such entity.

On p. 37, Dr. Das has dealt with the Navya-Nyāya analysis of the structure of the cognition '*rūpavān brāhmaṇo'yaṃ calati*', and in this connection, he has made the following remark :

"Note that the above example given by Maheśa Candra is misleading, because '*brāhmaṇatva*' is not a *jāti*, and the quality *rūpa* in the sense of beauty finds no place in the category of quality."

In this connection, it may be pointed out that whether *brāhmaṇatva* is a *jāti* or not has been hotly debated. Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas regarded *brāhamaṇatva* as a *jāti*, and they even regarded it as a perceptible property (cf. works like *Nyāyamañjarī*, *Nyāyakandalī* and *Tantravārttika*). This was opposed by Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas, who treated *brāhmaṇatva* as a *upādhi* (cf. *Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha Miśra), and this earned for them a lot of flak from the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas. Thus, Maheśa Candra has remained faithful to the Nyāya view that *brāhmaṇatva* is a *jāti*. What Dr. Das has said about *rūpa* in this connection is, however, perfectly justified.

On p. 50 and p. 66, Dr. Das has discussed the cognitions generated by the cognitions "*daṇḍa-kamaṇḍaludhāri puruṣaḥ gṛhe tiṣṭhati*" and "*śikhī puruṣaḥ gṛhe tiṣṭhati*" respectively. Below the diagrams given for describing such cognitions, we find the expressions "*daṇḍa-kamaṇḍalu-dhārini puruṣe gṛhe tiṣṭhati*" and "*śikhini puruṣe gṛhe tiṣṭhati*" respectively. Both these expressions are incomplete and improper. The terms *daṇḍakamaṇḍaludhāriṇi, śikhini, puruṣe* and *tiṣṭhati* that have been used in these expressions are in locative case according to the rules of Sanskrit grammar, as is clearly indicated by the word '*sati*' that one finds after both these expressions in NNBP. The confusion sems to have stemmed from the fact that the word "*tiṣṭhati*" may be derived in two ways—it may either be derived from the root *sthā* by declining it in the third person singular form of present tense, or it may be formed by adding the nominal suffix *śatṛ* to the root *sthā*, thus forming the word *tiṣṭhat*, and then declining it in the singular number of the locative case. Here, Maheśa Candra Nyāyaratna has used the term '*tiṣṭhati*' in the second sense. Thus, for him, it is an adjective of *puruṣa*; and not a verb, as has been perhaps understood by Dr. Das.

These minor erros do not, however, detract in any way from the considerable merits of the book, which, we hope, will find a hearty reception from enlightened persons who want to learn the basic techniques of Navya-Nyāya. The principal merit of this book is that it is written in an idiom that is readily understood by someone who has some acquaintance with Western Philosophy and Logic. We sincerely hope that in future, Dr. Das will continue to translate such important works from Sanskrit into English, thus making them accessible to a wider public.

Note to the Contributors

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